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The Public Pension Crisis
Jack M. Beermann*
Abstract
Unfunded employee pension obligations will present a serious
fiscal problem to state and local governments in the not-toodistant future. This Article takes a look at the causes and
potential cures for the public pension mess, mainly through the
lens of legal doctrines that limit public employers’ ability to avoid
obligations. As far as the causes are concerned, this Article
examines the political environment within which public pension
promises are made and funded, as an attempt to understand how
this occurred. The Article then turns to ask if states could
implement meaningful reforms without violating either state or
federal law. In particular, the Article looks at state balanced
budget requirements, state constitutional provisions regarding
public employee pensions, and federal constitutional law and asks
whether states could significantly reduce their pension promises to
public employees without violating the law. The entire analysis is
also informed by the concerns of the employees and retirees whose
perhaps sole source of retirement income would be reduced by
changes in benefit levels. The Article concludes with remarks
placing the matter in that context, raising the possibility of a
bailout to ameliorate the potentially disastrous consequences of
reform to public employees and retirees.
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I. Introduction

The first decade of the new millennium was a difficult one for
state and local government finances, and the second decade has
started out even worse. In addition to the difficulty governments
at all levels are experiencing in trying to maintain services
without raising taxes, some analysts claim that many state and
local governments are sitting on a fiscal time bomb—underfunded
public employee pension and health care liabilities1 that threaten
to destroy the fiscal well-being of many state and local
governments. Some accounts predict that absent significant
benefits reductions (which may not be legally feasible), state and
local governments will soon be devoting an untenably large
1. This Article focuses primarily on unfunded pension liabilities. State
and local governments also have substantial unfunded health care liabilities,
and a few distinct aspects of that problem are highlighted in this Article.

THE PUBLIC PENSION CRISIS

5

portion of their budgets to making pension payments and
satisfying other obligations to retired workers.
Unfunded liabilities are possible because government
pensions are still largely defined benefit plans, and the law
generally does not require full advance funding of the projected
costs of accrued benefits. In a defined benefit plan, an employee is
promised a specific dollar amount of retirement benefits, usually
based on the employee’s final salary. These promises are often
accompanied by promises of lifetime government-financed health
care, without regard to the cost to the public employer. Although
states operate under balanced budget requirements, it turns out
that underfunding pension obligations does not violate these
state law requirements.2 Thus, current taxpayers are able to push
off pension and other promises to retirees to future generations of
taxpayers.
Private industry has moved away from defined benefit plans
toward contribution plans, under which employers contribute a
fixed amount to an employee’s retirement plan and the employee
receives retirement benefits based on the performance of the
investments purchased with the contributions. The advantage of
a contribution plan to employers is obvious—certainty. Once an
employer makes the contributions required under the plan, there
is no chance that actuarial miscalculations or market downturns
will require additional contributions in the future. The employee,
not the employer, bears the risk of a market downturn or
inflation that might reduce the value of the pension.
Defined contribution plans also have some advantages for
employees. First, employees may gain control over their funds
and have the power to direct investments to their preferred level
of risk. Second, employees’ retirement funds are not subject to the
solvency of the employer. There is no opportunity for employers to
manipulate contribution levels. Further, once the employer’s
money is deposited into the account, the employer cannot raid the
fund or take any other action that would prejudice the employees’
ownership of the fund.3
2. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE
BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 8 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/
fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE
BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE STATES 40 (2008)).
3. This is not to say that private contribution retirement plans are risk-
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While most public employers and employees in the United
States set aside money each year to fund future projected pension
obligations, many public pension plans are seriously underfunded
either intentionally or due to unrealistic assumptions concerning
investment performance and the amount that will be owed over
time.4 This means that unless contributions are increased
substantially, future pension payments to retired government
workers will be made, at least in part, from current revenues.
The problem is thought to be so serious that some local
governments may be effectively insolvent. Retirees face the risk
of reduced pension payments and current employees face the risk
of receiving less generous retirement benefits than the promises
that they have been depending upon.
In the private sector, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)5 and programs administered by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation provide a mechanism to deal with
insolvent pension plans and the outstanding pension obligations
of bankrupt private firms.6 The financial consequences of pension
plan insolvency to private companies and their employees may be
disastrous, but ultimately they can be resolved in an orderly
manner without forcing the company to pay all of its obligations.
State and local governments have fewer options. State law7 and
the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution8 may make
it impossible for states to enact meaningful pension reform or
simply discharge obligations that are too difficult to meet. Even if
a state is insolvent, the federal Constitution may demand
complete payment of all pension obligations. Bankruptcy may be
free, but federal regulations under ERISA, Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006), prevent private companies
from failing to make required payments. Employees may suffer if their plan is
terminated due to the insolvency of the employer or the inability or
unwillingness of the employer to continue to contribute, but past contributions
are largely safe in private plans.
4. See infra notes 17–24, 32, 114, 151 & 319–20 and accompanying text.
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1461 (2006). ERISA makes underfunding of private pension liabilities unlawful.
6. For a suggestion that ERISA be extended to state and local pensions,
see Jon G. Miller, Is Your Client’s Government Pension Safe?: Making the Case
for Federal Regulation, 2 ELDER L.J. 121, 121 (1994).
7. See infra Part III.
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
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an option for some municipalities, but this very drastic step is not
open to all municipalities, and is not available to the states
themselves.
Even if everyone agreed that the best option would be to
move away from defined benefit plans to defined contribution
plans, implementing this change could be difficult because of the
magnitude of unfunded liabilities. If paying current retirees’
benefits depends on contributions from active government
employees and current tax revenues, it may be impossible to
move current employees to contribution plans without
magnifying the crisis beyond manageability.
The public pension crisis raises three separate concerns. The
first involves the potential fiscal disaster that some predict will
occur years from now, when public employers are required to pay
the pension benefits they have been promising to public
employees for many years. The second concern is the reduction in
government services that may be necessary to make these
payments, which could lead to great taxpayer dissatisfaction and
political instability. The third concern involves the consequences
to public employees and retirees, especially those who did not
participate in Social Security, who could be left with insufficient
assets for a decent retirement.
Underfunding public pensions is in substance, if not in form,
an example of deficit spending in which current taxpayers enjoy
the benefits of government services while pushing off some of the
costs to future taxpayers. It is a double whammy for those future
taxpayers—they will not only be required to pay for the
consumption of prior generations, but will also receive reduced
government services as state and local governments allocate
funds to pensions and health care for retired workers rather than
services for current taxpayers.
It should be noted that some analysts deny that there is a
crisis in public pension costs looming just over the horizon.9 In
their view, the total unfunded pension and health care liability of
state and local governments is relatively small when compared to
the overall revenues of state and local government.10 They also
point out that the average pension earned by retired government
9.
10.

See infra notes 28–36 and accompanying text.
See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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workers is small—under $20,000 per year.11 On this view, the
“pension” crisis is an effort by conservative political forces to
undermine public employee unions whose members tend to
support liberal politicians and views.12
Although the matter is not free from doubt, this Article
proceeds on the assumption that there is at least some truth to
the conclusion reached by many, that pension obligations will
present a serious fiscal problem in the not-too-distant future.
This Article takes a look at the causes and potential cures for the
public pension mess, mainly through the lens of legal doctrines
that limit public employers’ ability to avoid obligations. As far as
the causes are concerned, this Article examines the political
environment within which public pension promises are made and
funded, as an attempt to understand how this occurred. The first
issue here is whether the promises governments have made to
public employees are extravagant in light of the pay, benefits, job
security, and opportunities for advancement of state and local
government workers as compared to workers in private industry.
The Article then turns to ask if states could implement
meaningful reforms without violating either state or federal law.
In particular, the Article looks at state balanced budget
requirements, state constitutional provisions regarding public
employee pensions, and federal constitutional law and asks
whether states could significantly reduce their pension promises
to public employees without violating the law. The entire analysis
is also informed by the concerns of the employees and retirees
whose perhaps sole source of retirement income would be reduced
by changes in benefit levels. The Article concludes with remarks
placing the matter in that context, raising the possibility of a
bailout to ameliorate the possibly disastrous consequences of
reform to public employees and retirees.

11. See The 4 Most Important Sources of Retirement Income, U.S. NEWS
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/planning-to-retire/2012/
03/22/the-4-most-important-sources-of-retirement-income (last visited Feb. 2,
2013) [hereinafter Retirement Income] (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
12. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (providing examples of
optimistic analysts).
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II. The Political Economy of Public Pensions
There are at least three separate issues regarding the
political economy of public pension funding. First is the basic
question of whether unfunded retirement promises to
government workers constitute a fiscal crisis or whether the issue
has been created as a means of attacking public employee unions
or generally attempting to reduce compensation to public
workers.13 The second issue concerns the nature of retirement
promises to government workers: Are the promises excessive and
subject to manipulation and abuse, or are they simply part of a
perhaps generous, but reasonable overall, compensation package?
The final issue is, assuming that public employee retirement
benefits are excessive or subject to abuse, how did this happen:
Why would elected officials provide excessive retirement benefits
to government employees?

13. Attention to the underfunding of public pensions is not new. An early
hint at the forthcoming crisis was a 1976 Harvard Law Review Note discussing
potential problems that might arise regarding public pensions in difficult fiscal
times, such as altering the eligibility and benefits rules and moving investments
into state securities. See Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal
Distress, 90 HARV. L. REV. 992, 992–93 (1976) [hereinafter Public Employee
Pensions] (noting the rise in public employee pension funds and the riskiness of
these programs). In 1978, the Pension Task Force Report on Public Employee
Retirement Systems estimated state and local unfunded pension liabilities at
$150 to $175 billion. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG.,
PENSION TASK FORCE REP. ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 165
(Comm. Print 1978). A 1979 report to Congress by the Comptroller General
characterized the underfunding of state and local pensions as a national
problem. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HRD-79-66, FUNDING OF STATE
AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS: A NATIONAL PROBLEM 2 (1979) (reporting on “the
magnitude of unfunded accrued liabilities, actions or lack of actions being taken
to fund the plans on a sound actuarial basis, and the fiscal impact of requiring
actuarial funding on [s]tate and local governments”). This report noted that
most of the pension funds it analyzed were underfunded using ERISA
standards. Id. at 19. A 1981 article in the journal Public Choice posited two
explanations for continued growth in unfunded pension liabilities: increased
income of municipal employees made deferred compensation more attractive to
the employees and demand for public services, due to baby boomers going to
public schools, grew faster than the tax base, which made deferred
compensation attractive to governments. See Dennis Epple & Katherine
Schipper, Municipal Pension Funding: A Theory and Some Evidence, 37 PUB.
CHOICE 141, 170 (1981).
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A. How Large Is the Potential Fiscal Problem?

The public pension crisis is all over the news. Analysts refer
to unfunded pension obligations as a ticking fiscal time bomb
likely to cause serious problems in the future.14 California is the
state with the largest unfunded pension obligations, and a recent
report predicts that without significant, immediate reform, public
services in California will face drastic cuts as more and more of
the state’s budget is devoted to making pension payments.15
Other analysts dispute this and argue that pension obligations
constitute a relatively small portion of state budgets and should
be manageable over time.16 Which view is more accurate?
Those claiming that there is a public pension funding crisis
seriously outnumber those making the contrary claim that
pension debt is manageable. One study reported that unfunded
obligations to public school teachers alone have been stated to
total $332 billion, but the study’s own calculations put the figure
at $933 billion, or nearly a trillion dollars.17 The Pew Center
estimates are on the lower end, with a total of $1.38 trillion
estimated to be underfunded for both pensions and retiree health
care benefits for all state and local employees.18 A report by the
14. Problems with funding of public pensions are not confined to the United
States. See Eduard Ponds, Clara Severinson & Juan Yermo, Funding in Public
Sector Pension Plans-International Evidence 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17082, 2011) (discussing global pension fund issues). Many
nations have underfunded public employee pension plans. Id. at 21, 28. Some
are completely or partly “pay as you go,” which means by design, no funds are
set aside to pay future pension obligations—all benefits are paid out of the
current budget. Id. at 7.
15. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, PUBLIC PENSIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY 3,
21 (2011) (detailing the status of public pensions in California).
16. See, e.g., Zach Carter, An Overblown “Crisis” for State Pension Funds,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2011, 10:20 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/03/07/state-pension-plans_n_829112.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (noting
that “most states’ pension funds are doing just fine”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POLICY INST.,
DISCOUNTING PUBLIC PENSIONS: REPORTS OF TRILLIONS IN SHORTFALLS IGNORE
EXPECTED RETURNS ON ASSETS 1 (2011) (claiming that the pension crisis is
exaggerated).
17. See JOSH BARRO & STUART BUCK, FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE OF THE
MANHATTAN INST. REPORT FOR POLICY RESEARCH, UNDERFUNDED TEACHER
PENSION PLANS: IT’S WORSE THAN YOU THINK 2 (2010) (claiming $933 billion
shortfall in teacher pension funding).
18. See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE WIDENING GAP UPDATE 1 (2012)
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Little Hoover Commission, a bipartisan state oversight agency,
estimates the unfunded liabilities of California’s ten largest
public pension plans (of a total of eighty-seven studied) at $240
billion and predicts that large cities in California will soon be
devoting one-third of their operating budgets to pension
payments.19 Another study concludes that to achieve full funding,
government contributions to employee retirement, including
social security and pensions, will have to increase by 250%,
representing 14.1% of total revenues.20 A Mercatus Center study
has estimated the national gap to be approximately $3 trillion,21
as does a 2012 report by a group chaired by former New York
Lieutenant Governor Richard Ravitch and former Federal
Reserve Board Chair Paul Volcker.22 A new study, published in
[hereinafter PEW CENTER, THE WIDENING GAP], http://www.pewstates.org/up
loadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Pensions_Update.pdf (describing the status
of “the gap between states’ assets and their obligations for public sector
retirement benefits” for fiscal year 2010); see also PEW CENTER ON THE STATES,
PROMISES WITH A PRICE: PUBLIC SECTOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS (2005) [hereinafter
PEW CENTER, PROMISES], http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrusts
org/Reports/State_policy/pension_report.pdf (detailing the costs of pension
plans). This is an excellent comprehensive report on the finances of state
retirement promises.
19. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 15, at 3, 21.
20. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The Revenue Demands of Public
Employee Pension Promises 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 18489, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18489. This
conclusion depends on important assumptions concerning investment
performance, particularly that pension fund investments will grow at the same
rate as Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) plus inflation, and on the
effect that revenue shifts and increased taxes would have on the stability of the
tax base. Id. at 3–4.
21. See Eileen Norcross & Andrew Biggs, The Crisis in Public Sector
Pension Plans: A Blueprint for Reform in New Jersey 1 (Mercatus Ctr., Working
Paper No. 10-31, 2010). One problem is that there is no uniform standard for
reporting the level of pension funding. See id. (“Using methods that are required
for private sector pensions, which value pension liabilities according to
likelihood of payment rather than the return expected on pension assets, total
liabilities amount to $5.2 trillion and the unfunded liability rises to $3 trillion.”).
For a proposal to create a uniform legal standard for reporting pension funding,
see Daniel J. Kaspar, Defined Benefits, Undefined Costs: Moving Toward a More
Transparent Accounting of State Public Employee Pension Plans, 3 WM. & MARY
POL’Y REV. 1 (2011).
22. See REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE 2, 35 (2012),
http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-StateBudget-Crisis-Task-Force-Full.pdf (reporting on “the fiscal problems faced by
the states of this nation in the aftermath of the global financial crisis”). This
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July 2012, comes to this startling conclusion: “[T]he average
public employee pension plan in the United States is only around
41 percent funded while total unfunded liabilities as of 2011 are
roughly $4.6 trillion.”23 Another analysis, by an economist at the
Center for Economic Policy and Research, estimates the shortfall
at $647 billion, using traditional rates of return for pension fund
assets.24 This is a significant shortfall, but much lower than the
$3 or $4 trillion figures used by others.
To put the magnitude of underfunding in perspective, the
federal government’s total debt, as of March 2012, is
approximately $16.5 trillion25 as compared to $3.8 trillion in
annual spending, while total state and local spending per year is
approximately $3.2 trillion with an estimated $2.99 trillion total
debt.26 It is unclear whether this estimate of state and local debt
includes unfunded pension liabilities. Assuming it does not,
counting $3 trillion in unfunded pension liability and $1 trillion
report provides a comprehensive look at state finances, including structural
problems it concludes were exposed during the economic recession beginning in
2008. Id. at 2. Increased Medicaid spending and potential reductions in federal
grants are cited as primary contributors to current state fiscal problems. Id. It
arrives at its $3 trillion estimate of underfunding by using a lower discount rate
than the 8% rate of return commonly used by pension plans to estimate the
amount current funds will cover in future liabilities. It also estimates unfunded
medical care promises as “likely to be well above $1 trillion.” Id. at 43. The
report also notes that governments rarely set aside anything in advance to meet
those promises. Id.
23. ANDREW G. BIGGS, STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS, PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS:
HOW WELL FUNDED ARE THEY, REALLY? 1 (2012), http://www.statebudget
solutions.org/doclib/20120716_PensionFinancingUpdate.pdf (describing how
public pension plans currently value their financial health). This study also
observes that the funding problem has gotten much worse relatively recently:
“According to standard actuarial accounting, the average public pension has
fallen to around 75 percent in 2011, versus 103 percent in 2000.” Id.
24. DEAN BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, THE ORIGINS AND
SEVERITY OF THE PUBLIC PENSION CRISIS 10 (2011), www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/pensions-2011-02.pdf (arguing that most states face manageable
pension shortfalls because current levels are only due to the 2007–2009
economic downturn).
25. For a current estimate of the national debt of the United States, see Ed
Hall, U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/ (last visited
Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. Unless otherwise indicated, the figures in this paragraph are drawn
from Christopher Chantrill, U.S. Government Spending, http://www.
usgovernmentspending.com/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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in unfunded retiree health care benefits promises would put the
total state and local debt at approximately $6.5 trillion, or about
2.5 years of total spending, while the federal government’s debt
equals more than 4 years of total federal spending. Websites like
pensiontsunami.com (devoted to California’s pension issues)
exemplify the near-consensus that pension obligations are a
ticking fiscal time bomb for state and local governments.27
The contrary view—that there is no public pension funding
crisis—is best exemplified by an article published on the
Huffington Post titled, An Overblown ‘Crisis’ For State Pension
Funds28 and Monique Morrissey’s study titled Discounting Public
Pensions: Reports of Trillions in Shortfalls Ignore Expected
Returns on Assets.29 These articles claim that state and local
pension obligations are manageable, and that the contrary view is
based on conservative analysts using low projected rates of return
on pension fund assets to make the funding gap look larger than
it actually is.30 Morrissey’s study claims that to meet the actual
shortfalls, state and local governments would have to increase
their pension funding from 4% of their budgets to 5%, a
significant but manageable increase.31 While many studies attack
state and local pension funds for justifying low current
contributions by predicting an 8% return on investments,
Morrissey claims that 8% is historically accurate and more
realistic than the much lower Treasury Bill rate used by those
claiming that a crisis exists.32
27. Another example of an analysis claiming that there is a crisis is a 2010
report by Taxpayers for Wilson. See PUBLIC PENSIONS: AVERTING NEW YORK’S
LOOMING TAX CATASTROPHE 3 (2010), http://Wilsonfornewyork.com/images/
uploads/36771370-Public-Pensions-Averting-New-York%E2%80%99s-Looming-TaxCatastrophe.pdf (exploring the public data to determine the depth of the pension
crisis in New York). This report was issued by the campaign of a candidate,
Harry Wilson, for New York State Comptroller. Wilson lost the election. See
Harry Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 3, 2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/w/harry_wilson/index.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2013) (detailing the campaign of Mr. Wilson) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
28. Carter, supra note 16.
29. MORRISSEY, supra note 16.
30. Carter, supra note 16; MORRISSEY, supra note 16, at 1–2.
31. MORRISSEY, supra note 16, at 1.
32. Id. at 2–3.
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A particularly comprehensive study concluding that
unfunded pension liabilities do not present a severe problem was
published in 2007 by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), the research arm of Congress.33 That study found that
“the additional pension contributions that state and local
governments will need to make in future years to fully fund their
pensions on an ongoing basis are only slightly higher than the
current contribution rate.”34 Specifically, the study found that
“contribution rates would need to rise to 9.3 percent of salaries—
less than a half percent more than the 9.0 percent contribution
rate in 2006.”35 The GAO report was much more concerned about
health care costs because many governments do not set aside
anything to fund health care promises, and if health care costs
continue to rise, it may be difficult for the promises to be
fulfilled.36
The Huffington Post article reveals the political nature of
this dispute.37 The article characterizes the Economic Policy
Institute, which concludes that there is no serious problem, as
“partly funded by unions,” and attacks the Mercatus study as
unreliable at least partly because the Mercatus Center is funded
by the Koch brothers, well-known conservative activists.
33. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1156, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: CURRENT STATUS OF BENEFIT STRUCTURES,
PROTECTIONS, AND FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR FUNDING FUTURE COSTS 4 (2007)
(studying the status of public pension funds as of 2007).
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. This study was conducted before the financial crisis and recession
that began in 2008, so it is unclear if these calculations are still accurate. For a
slightly more recent study of the funding status of state and local government
retiree benefits, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-223, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: CURRENT FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION
AND HEALTH BENEFITS (2008).
36. Another report concludes that while in 2010 3.8% of state and local
budgets were devoted to paying pension costs, that figure would rise to
somewhere between 5% and 12.5%, depending on the health of the plan and
investment outcomes. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY & LAURA
QUINBY, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC PENSIONS ON STATE AND
LOCAL BUDGETS 1 (2010) (examining “the size of the additional funding relative
to state budgets” for public pensions). Some states, however, would have more
serious problems. For example, the authors predict that Illinois, a state with
severe underfunding of pension plans, may have to devote approximately 17% of
its state budget to meet all of its pension obligations. See id. at 6, fig.9.
37. See Carter, supra note 16.
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Morrissey points out that the same conservatives who use the low
Treasury Bill rate as the expected return on pension fund assets
touted privatization of Social Security accounts on the basis of
much higher returns in the stock market.38
My sense is that while there may be some exaggeration out
there, the pension funding crisis is real. In a detailed review of
public pension financing, Jonathan Forman makes a convincing
case that there is a funding problem.39 As Forman explains:
Because governments tolerate an 80% funding level and use
actuarial valuations instead of market valuations, public
pensions are almost guaranteed to be underfunded. Public
sector workers tend to get larger pensions as a result, but
much of the cost of those larger pensions is pushed onto future
generations of taxpayers.40

The 2012 analysis by a group led by Paul Volcker, with
distinguished members such as Alice Rivlin, Nicholas Brady, and
George Shultz, concludes that unfunded pension and retiree
health care liabilities are significant and, absent serious reform,
will contribute to future fiscal problems.41 The amount of time
and energy being devoted to raising alarms about the fiscal
consequences of promises to retirees by responsible groups seems
out of proportion if the purpose is to mount an indirect attack on
public employee unions and public collective bargaining. While
38.
39.

MORRISSEY, supra note 16, at 3–4.
See Jonathan B. Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 837, 837 (2009) (discussing “the major financial, accounting,
and legal issues that relate to the funding of state and local government pension
plans” and options to ensure public employees will have future retirement
benefits).
40. Id. at 860. Forman explains that “bad things happen” when pension
funds are fully funded because employees often successfully lobby for increased
pension benefits and legislatures reduce payments or take funding “holidays” to
use the money for other purposes. Id. at 860–61. Surprisingly, Forman
nevertheless calls for full current funding but proposes a more radical
restructuring for future government employees that would either eliminate the
traditional method of calculating pension payments based on the highest salary
or replace benefit plans with contribution plans. Id. at 870–73.
41. REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 22, at 2–3.
For an analysis of the likely consequences to retiree health care benefits, see
Richard Kaplan, Nicholas Powers & Jordan Zucker, Retirees at Risk: The
Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 287 (2009).
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some politicians may have used this pension issue as a basis for
attacking public employee unions, there seems to be genuine
concern over future pension funding from a diverse array of
observers, including the New York Times, which does not
generally carry the flag for conservative causes.
The situation with health care promises to retirees may be
even worse than the pension problem because fewer state and
local government entities have set aside any funds to pay for
those expenses. Coupled with serious inflation in the cost of
health care and health insurance, the failure to set aside funds to
pay for this may prove disastrous as more workers retire.
B. Are Public Pension Promises Excessive or Abusive?
While the point is subject to dispute, let us assume that
unfunded promises to current and future retirees constitute a
significant fiscal problem for state and local governments. The
next set of questions involves whether excessive promises of
retirement benefits have been made to public employees and
whether public pension plans are subject to abuse.
The defense of defined benefit public pensions often begins by
pointing out that the average government employee pension is
less than $20,000 per year,42 which certainly does not sound
excessive. It is not clear, however, whether this is a meaningful
figure. There are many government pension recipients who
worked for the government just long enough to qualify, and who
thus receive very small pensions. What really needs to be
examined is the pension available to the government employee
who makes a career in government service, how that fits into the
overall compensation package for government employees, and
how public retirement benefits compare to the retirement
benefits available to private sector employees.43
42. Retirement Income, supra note 11.
43. Another issue pertinent to evaluating the generosity of public pension
promises is the age at which public employees can retire. For example, in
Wisconsin, which seems to be typical, “[m]ost public-sector employees are able to
retire at age fifty-seven with a full pension if they have at least thirty years of
services.” Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in
Public Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 263, 273–74 (2011). Full
pension benefits at age fifty-seven is generous on its own, and also means that
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One possibility that should be dismissed is to make a direct
comparison between public sector pensions and federal Social
Security retirement benefits. One could imagine comparing
contributions and benefits and ask whether public pension
recipients are receiving overly generous benefits. There are two
sets of reasons why this comparison is not apt. First, Social
Security taxes pay for aspects of the program that go far beyond
retirement benefits. In addition to retirement benefits, the
payroll deductions required by the Federal Insurance
Contribution Act (FICA)44 pay for disability benefits, survivor
benefits for spouses and children, a small death benefit, and
potential benefits for multiple former spouses.45 Further, Social
Security is fully portable between jobs. Second, public sector
pensions are part of the state and local employees’ compensation
packages from their employer. In principle, the magnitude of
their contributions to the fund is irrelevant to whether the
pension promises are overly generous. When a person decides
whether to accept government employment, and to remain in
government employment when other opportunities arise,
pensions and other postemployment benefits are undoubtedly
part of the calculus. Current salaries may be lower for
government employees in the public sector than for workers in
the private sector, and the public sector may offer fewer
opportunities for advancement, especially for those without
political connections. Greater job security, pensions, and retiree
health care promises may balance these factors out, so that
overall the promises to retirees are not out of line. As a form of
deferred compensation, public sector pensions may be perfectly
reasonable.
Thus, even if it is true, as one study claims, that public
pensions can be 4.5 times higher than Social Security benefits
based on the same work history,46 this may not establish
the payments will continue for a long period of time after retirement.
44. Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3128
(2006).
45. Id.
46. See Social Security Benefits vs. Public Pensions, CIV FI (May 8, 2010),
http://civfi.com/2010/05/08/social-security-vs-public-pensions/ (last visited Feb 2,
2013) (comparing Social Security benefit payouts to public pensions) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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anything about the fairness of public pensions.47 This possibility
should also be tempered by the fact that Social Security
recipients contribute less than many public pension recipients.
Before recent stimulus measures, the combined employeremployee contribution to Social Security was 12.4% of the first
$110,000 of income,48 while the combined contribution to public
pensions in some jurisdictions may be closer to 20% or even
more.49 There may be states and localities in which employees are
required to contribute much less, with the expectation that the
government will fund retirement benefits, but again, the real
question is whether the pension is reasonable as an element of
compensation, not as a direct comparison with Social Security
benefits.50
This picture is complicated by disagreement over whether
public-sector workers truly earn less in current and overall
compensation than their private-sector counterparts. In some
circles, it is now widely thought that public-sector workers earn
47. It may also be the case that Social Security is underpaying based on
contributions. For an argument that Social Security is a bad deal for current
workers, see generally Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Social
Security’s Treatment of Postwar Americans: How Bad Can It Get?, in THE
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (Martin Feldstein et al.
eds., 2002).
48. Larry Villano, Self-Employment Tax, http://www.loopholelewy.com/
loopholelewy/05-business-taxes/self-employment-tax-01-what-is.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2013) (detailing the tax payments for Social Security) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
49. One report states that in Missouri, combined teacher and employer
contributions have risen to 29% of salary in an attempt to accumulate sufficient
equity to support promised pensions. See Robert Costrell, Michael Podgursky &
Christian Weller, Fixing Teacher Pensions, EDUCATION NEXT, Fall 2011, at 60–
69, http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_20114_forum.pdf. (containing an
exchange between Professors Costrell and Podgursky on one side, and Professor
Weller on the other). Costrell and Podgursky advocate tying pension payments
to contributions, with employers guaranteeing a level of payments in case of
investment underperformance. Id. at 64–65.
50. It may be more useful to compare the replacement rate of public
pensions with the replacement rate of private pensions. The replacement rate is
the percentage of salary replaced by the pension. In 1985, a study calculated
that the average worker retiring in 1984 at a $40,000 salary with forty years of
service received a pension replacing 32.3% of salary. See DONALD SCHMITT,
MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, TODAY’S PENSION PLANS: HOW MUCH DO THEY PAY? 22
tbl.5 (1985). These retirees would also receive Social Security benefits, which
would replace another portion of their salaries. Still, this is likely to be a lower
replacement rate than what many public sector employees receive today.
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greater total salary and benefits than comparable private-sector
workers. For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that
in December 2010, private-sector workers earned approximately
$28 per hour in total compensation, while their public-sector
counterparts at the state and local level earned approximately
$40.51
Politicians have noticed this purported fact. Indiana
Governor Mitch Daniels has described public sector workers as “a
new privileged class in America,”52 while former Minnesota
Governor Tim Pawlenty stated: “It used to be that public
employees were underpaid and over-benefited. Now they are
over-benefited and overpaid compared to their private-sector
counterparts.”53 It is unclear, however, whether this is due to
gains by public employees or losses in the private sector, where
defined benefit pension plans have virtually disappeared along
with many high-paying jobs.
As should be expected, it is also not clear whether the
apparent compensation disparity between public and private
sector employees is real. Views on this seem to fall along similar
political fault lines as to whether the funding crisis is real or
imagined. Some studies dispute the disparity theory by claiming
that higher pay for government workers is attributable to age,
education, and skill level required for the jobs.54 When one
51. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE
COMPENSATION–DECEMBER 2010, at 1 (2011), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/ecec_03092011.pdf.
52. Ben Smith & Maggie Haberman, Pols Turn on Labor Unions, POLITICO
(June 6, 2010, 7:03 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/38183.html
(last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (noting a turn in the political environment against
government employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. Joe Kimball, Gov. Pawlenty: Public Employees Are “Over-Benefited and
Overpaid,” MINNPOST.COM (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.minnpost.com/political
agenda/2010/04/30/17788/gov_pawlenty_public_employees_are_over-benefited_
and_overpaid (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
54. See SYLVIA A. ALLEGRETTO & JEFFREY KEEFE, BERKELEY CTR. ON WAGES
AND EMP’T DYNAMICS, THE TRUTH ABOUT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN CALIFORNIA: THEY
ARE NEITHER OVERPAID NOR OVERCOMPENSATED 3 (2010) (“A re-estimated
regression equation of total compensation (which includes wages and benefits)
demonstrates that there is no significant difference in total compensation
between full-time state and local employees and private-sector employees.”)
(emphasis omitted); KEITH A. BENDER & JOHN S. HEYWOOD, NAT’L INST. ON RET.
SEC., OUT OF BALANCE? COMPARING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR COMPENSATION
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accounts for these and similar traits, it is argued that publicsector workers are undercompensated relative to their privatesector counterparts.55 One 2010 study, by the Center for
Economic and Policy Research, found a 4% wage “penalty” for
public sector workers, taking into account wages and benefits,
and controlling for age and education.56
There is no question that public employees as a group receive
vastly higher defined benefit pension compensation than private
employees because most private employers have halted the
practice. Many public employees, about one in four, are not in the
Social Security system, which means that their state pension is
their only source of employer and government support in old
age.57 It would be grossly unfair to state employees if pension
reform did not take into account the fact that they do not
participate in the federal Social Security system. Comparing the
raw numbers between private and public employee pension
payments should take Social Security into account, especially
because participating employers and employees both contribute
to Social Security.

20 YEARS 3 (2010) (concluding that on average state and local employees
are underpaid by approximately 7% when compared to private-sector workers);
JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RES., THE WAGE PENALTY FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 3 (2010) (“When state and local government
employees are compared to private-sector workers with similar characteristics—
particularly when workers are matched by age and education—state and local
workers actually earn 4 percent less, on average, than their private-sector
counterparts.”); Jeffrey Keefe, Debunking the Myth of the Overcompensated
Public Employee: The Evidence 3 (Econ. Policy Inst., Briefing Paper No. 276,
2010) (“Prior research reveals that education level is the single most important
earnings predictor.”); Michael A. Miller, The Public-Private Pay Debate: What
Do the Data Show?, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 18, 18 (1996) (finding mixed results
with lower-level state and local workers earning more than their private
counterparts but higher-level workers earning more in the private sector than
the public sector).
55. Keefe, supra note 54, at 11–12.
56. Id. at 5. Keefe’s analysis has been attacked. See, e.g., CTR. FOR UNION
FACTS, THE ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE IS WRONG: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ARE
OVERPAID 1, 7–8, http://www.unionfacts.com/downloads/Public_Sector_Unions
Brief.pdf (claiming that Keefe’s study is incorrect and public employees are
overcompensated).
57. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS
COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY 5 (2012).
OVER
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One author reports that in Wisconsin, which he characterizes
as the eighth most generous state in terms of income
replacement, the average retired worker receives a pension equal
to 57% of their preretirement salary.58 The full pension is paid
after thirty-five years at age fifty-seven for retirees other than
public safety employees.59 More comprehensively, a 1997 table
reports average replacement rates for public employees without
Social Security of about 62%,60 but this may be lower than the
replacement rate for current retirees if reports that governments
have sweetened pensions in recent years are true. This rate is
more generous for most private employees receiving pensions but
not to such a great extent when Social Security payments are
included in the comparison.
As in many situations, the view that public-employee
pensions are excessive is supported by notorious instances of
what is known as pension “spiking,” in which employees take
advantage of provisions in pension plans that allow them to
increase their pension benefits, often as they prepare to retire.
Public employee pensions are usually based on the employee’s
pay at the end of the career, often the average of the employee’s
last three or five years of government employment. Employees
make efforts to increase their pay at the end of their careers to
“spike” their pensions. Even if the methods employees use to
spike their pensions are within the rules of the pension system,
they seem illegitimate for the simple reason that pensions
manipulated in this manner are not related to the employee’s
needs and legitimate expectations after retirement.
Here are a few examples of pension spiking. One way that
pensions can be spiked is to add additional part-time work during
the years when salary is used to calculate pension benefits. For
example, in some jurisdictions, public high school teachers can
teach evening courses at a community college and then count that
58. See Secunda, supra note 43, at 273 (examining the status of Wisconsin’s
public pension as an example of the larger topic).
59. Id. at 273–74.
60. See ANN C. FOSTER, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSIONS: A COMPARISON, COMPENSATION & WORKING
CONDITIONS 41 (1997), http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/archive/summer1997art5.
pdf (comparing public and private pension plans and including Social Security
as a relevant factor).
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pay in total salary for pension purposes. This apparently common
practice among teachers in some areas can boost pension benefits
significantly. In Massachusetts (and perhaps in other states),
longevity clauses are included in public employees’ collective
bargaining agreements.61 The employee informs the employer
either one or three years in advance that they plan to retire and
under the agreement, their salary is boosted in recognition of
their longevity. This also boosts their pension, which is the design
of the contract. If the employee changes her mind and decides not
to retire, she can simply pay the bonus back to the governmental
unit. The amount and length of the bonus (usually either one or
three years) is determined in unionized sectors in collective
bargaining between the employee union and the governmental
unit.
Another legally sanctioned form of pension spiking involves
pension “buybacks” for various forms of service outside the
pension system. Under a buyback program, an employee is
allowed to pay a year’s contribution to the system to purchase a
year of service credit toward a state pension. Employee
contributions are not sufficient to cover the increased costs to the
pension system, so these buybacks are a good deal for the
employee but not for taxpayers who will be required to make up
the shortfall sometime in the future. For example, in 2002
Massachusetts enacted a provision allowing public school
teachers to buy pension credit for years in the Peace Corps.62
Several other bills were proposed in the following years to expand
buybacks, in the midst of efforts to eliminate abuses such as
counting volunteer service on government boards toward pension
service; one day to one year of service provisions (which were
used by outgoing legislators to receive an entire year of service
credit for the first week of January when their terms expired);
and king for a day provisions, which allowed employees to be
61. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the Cohasset
School Committee and the Cohasset Teachers’ Association (2009–2012),
http://educatorcontracts.doemass.org/file.aspx?fieldno=1&filename=R%3A%5CM
ass+DOE%5CWebsearch%5CT-0065-12.pdf (including a longevity clause).
62. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32 § 4(1)(r); see also KEN ARDON, PIONEER INST.
FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, PUBLIC PENSIONS: UNFAIR TO STATE EMPLOYEES,
UNFAIR TO TAXPAYERS 10–13 (2006) (detailing buyback and similar provisions in
the public pension system in Massachusetts).
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promoted for one day and then retire at a higher rate.63 For
example, school nurses sought to be allowed to buy pension credit
for years in nursing before they entered a school system,64 and
higher education teachers sought to be included in the Peace
Corps buyback provision.65
One of the most striking examples of legislative largesse in
the pension area happened in Rhode Island in the 1980s. Rhode
Island public school teachers had been covered by state pensions
since 1936.66 As is generally true of public school teachers in the
United States, Rhode Island public school teachers are highly
unionized. In the 1980s, they lobbied for inclusion of their union’s
employees in the state pension plan despite the fact that they
were not government employees.67 In 1987, the Rhode Island
General Assembly obliged, and union employees were allowed to
join the teachers’ pension plan, conditioned on payments to buy
years of creditable service.68 As a court later detailed:
Bernard Singleton, for example, became a member of the
Retirement System effective January 1, 1990 . . . and promptly
purchased roughly 25 years of service credit for his prior union
employment at a cost of $25,411.09. On July 28, 1990, several
months later, at age 52, he took “early retirement” and
immediately began to collect a pension of approximately
$53,000 per year, with an expected lifetime benefit of about
$750,000.69

63. A bill eliminating some of these abusive practices was passed and
signed in 2009. See S. 2079, 186th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009). This law
eliminated pension credit for volunteer service and the one-day rule, under
which one day of work counted for pension purposes as a full year of service, and
it prohibited the practice of combining work from multiple government jobs to
receive a higher pension. Id.; see also Michael Levenson, Key Measures Passed in
Mass., BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2010, at 1 (discussing legislation passed in the
previous two years).
64. An Act Relative to the Retirement Options of Certain Educational
Personnel, S. 1090, 186th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009),
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/senate/186/st01pdf/ST01090.PDF.
65. See ARDON, supra note 62, at 12.
66. See Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’
Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (describing Rhode Island teachers’
pension provisions).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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The return on investment for these participants was beyond even
Bernard Madoff’s wildest dreams. “The district court later
calculated the plaintiffs’ total contribution to the Retirement
System at $1,995,784, the present value of their projected
pension benefits at about $11,430,579, and an average projected
rate of return for the individual plaintiffs of approximately 1250
percent.”70 Once the details of this plan became generally known,
the Rhode Island General Assembly repealed it and provided that
no further benefits would be paid.71 The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit upheld this repeal against attacks
based on federal constitutional rights to continued benefits.72
There are notorious individual instances of pension spiking
under which employees have boosted their pensions in ways that
seem illegitimate. The most famous example in Massachusetts is
William Bulger, who retired after thirty-five years in
Massachusetts government, including seventeen years as
President of the State Senate and seven years as President of the
University of Massachusetts.73 His retirement salary was
approximately $300,000, entitling him to a lifetime pension of
$179,000.74 In the last few years of his service as University
President, the Board of Trustees added a housing allowance to
his compensation, even though Bulger was living at his longtime
home that he owned.75 When Bulger retired (under pressure over
his relationship with his then-fugitive brother Whitey Bulger), he
included the housing allowance as part of his salary for pension
purposes, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed,
boosting the pension to $196,000 annually.76

70. Id. at 24–25.
71. Id. Participants were given a refund of their contributions in excess of
the amount they had already received in benefits.
72. Id.
73. See Bulger v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 856 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Mass.
2006) (determining what counted as “regular compensation” in calculating
retirement benefits).
74. See Bulger’s Bounty, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2005, at A14 (describing
William Bulger’s previous salary and pension payouts).
75. See Bulger, 856 N.E.2d at 805 (“The trustees were fully aware that
Bulger would continue to live in his home in the South Boston section of Boston
throughout his tenure as president of the university.”).
76. See id. at 801.
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Another Massachusetts example of pension spiking, which
provoked the above-mentioned reform efforts, involved a public
school teacher who added almost $5,500 per year to her $26,000
pension by including years of volunteer service on the board of
her city’s public library.77 The fact that she counted two years
during which she failed to attend a single library board meeting
made her case look even weaker than it would have had she
been a dedicated volunteer board member.78 One state
representative79 who spoke out in favor of closing this method of
pension spiking later included unpaid service on a local school
board as part of his pension-eligible service, provoking cries of
hypocrisy in a newspaper editorial.80 Finally, also in
Massachusetts, is the example of an employee working two fulltime government jobs and claiming two separate full pensions.81
77. See Sean P. Murphy, Ex-Lawmaker’s Wife Got Pension Boost: Credit
Given for Lynn Library Job, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2009, at B1. The article also
reports that the teacher’s ex-legislator husband also benefitted from generous
pension provisions apparently designed just for him by the Massachusetts
legislative leadership. Id. “The carefully tailored provision, which did not
mention Bassett by name, permitted him to collect his $41,000-a-year state
pension even while working full time as the Essex Regional Retirement Board
chairman and executive director, a job that currently pays him an estimated
$123,000 a year.” Id. Ex-representative Bassett was fined $10,000 for engaging
in private lobbying activity on government time using government facilities. See
Paul Leighton, Bassett Fined $10,000, SALEM NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://www.salemnews.com/local/x2117288138/Bassett-fined-10-000/print (last
visited Feb. 2, 2013) (describing Bassett’s illegal activities and penalties) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). He had been fired the prior year for
deficient performance “after years of controversy over his high salary, lavish
expense accounts, and exorbitant legal and consultant fees.” Id. The pensions of
both Bassetts apparently were boosted by legislative action crafted exclusively
for them at both the city and state levels. Id.
78. See Sean P. Murphy, Former Essex Retirement Chief Fined, BOS.
GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2011, at M1 (detailing the facts surrounding the fine of Timothy
Bassett).
79. See Edward Mason, Pol OK’d Pension Reform, but then Tried to Cash
In, BOS. HERALD, Sept. 30, 2009, at 6 (detailing the acts of a representative who
wanted credit for his years of service as an unpaid school committee member
days before an act banning such credit went into effect). This particular state
representative had been in the news for an “arrest in 2004 for drunken driving,
gross lewdness and disorderly conduct, and his $17,000 fine in 2007 and $10,000
in 2004 for violating Massachusetts campaign finance law.” Id.
80. See Editorial, Poster Boy for Reform, BOS. HERALD, Oct. 1, 2009, at 22
(describing the “unmitigated gall” of the representative as “breathtaking”).
81. See Matt Carroll, Ex-Officer Is Cleared on Fraud Charges, BOS. GLOBE,
June 15, 2007, at B1 (noting that the employee was collecting a $139,787
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Even if pensions to public officials are generally not abusive,
examples of abusive practices like those discussed above taint the
entire system.
C. Why?
Assuming that there is a funding crisis and that public sector
employees have been promised generous, and perhaps excessive
and potentially abusive retirement benefits, including pensions
and health care, the final question for this part of the discussion
is why did this happen. Why would politicians make such
promises and underfund them?
To a certain extent, the pathology is typical of deficit
spending by government.82 Incumbents can gain political support
by enacting programs favored by constituents without requiring
taxpayers to currently pay the full cost of the programs. Taxes
can remain low even as services expand. Taxpayers are happy to
enjoy the value of current services and reelect politicians that
provide them.
Deficit spending is not unambiguously bad. During poor
economic times, its use as economic stimulus may help cushion
the effects of recession and even spur economic growth. Too often,
however, deficit spending seems to be intended more for political
stimulus than economic stimulus. After record surpluses at the
end of the Clinton administration, tax cuts and increased
spending under George W. Bush put the federal budget in deficit,
which has continued and been amplified during the Obama
administration. Although the argument in favor of tax cuts is
that they increase economic activity which leads to more tax
pension, based on his average pay for the last three years of his working career,
which was the highest in Plymouth County history).
Sullivan [the prosecuting U.S. Attorney], in his report, said the
taxpayers of Plymouth County should find “the [employee’s] pension
situation to be incredibly offensive,” noting that [the employee] worked
only three years for the county but will be paid about $60,000 a year by
[county] taxpayers for the rest of his life.
Id.
82. See Darryl B. Simko, Of Public Pensions, State Constitutional Contract
Protection, and Fiscal Constraint, 69 TEMPLE L. REV. 1059, 1061 (1996)
(characterizing underfunded pensions as a form of deficit spending).
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revenue, it appears that tax increases during the Clinton years
contributed to surpluses then, and tax cuts at the outset of the
administration of George W. Bush contributed to deficits in every
budget he signed. Deficit spending appears to be a powerful
political stimulus.
Unfunded pension promises benefit politicians in two ways.
First, as in all deficit spending, they allow for current officials to
provide services without requiring taxpayers to pay for them
until much later, when they may be out of office.83 Second,
pension promises help politicians shore up support among
government workers,84 or at least avoid opposition from
government workers, which would be substantial if significant
reductions in pension benefits were proposed.
Taxpayers go along with underfunding for several simple
reasons. First, each taxpayer’s share of the overall liability is
likely to be relatively small, or at least appear to be small, at the
time the promises are made. The psychological tendency to
discount long-term problems likely reinforces the impression of
each taxpayer that the unfunded liability is not a problem for
them. Second, information on the extent of unfunded liabilities is
not readily available and what information there is may be
difficult to interpret. Taxpayers may simply not know that public
employees have been promised overly generous pensions or that
tax revenues are insufficient to fund them. This problem is
aggravated by the use of overly optimistic projected rates of
return on pension fund investments, which help obfuscate the
financial status of the funds. Third, some taxpayers may conclude
that they are unlikely to be affected by the whole mess at the
time the obligations come due. Taxpayers move, retire, and die,
all of which would minimize or exclude them from the negative
effects future taxpayers may suffer due to unfunded pension
liabilities.85
83. See David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677,
692 (2012) (discussing the possibility of a state bankruptcy (citing Joshua Rauh,
The Pension Bomb, MILKEN INST. REV. 26, 28 (2011))).
84. See id. at 691 (noting that lawmakers with a balanced budget
requirement can run a de facto deficit when they underfund government
workers’ pensions).
85. See Robert P. Inman, Public Employee Pensions and the Local Labor
Budget, 19 J. PUB. ECON. 49, 50 (1982) (arguing that mobile taxpayers are likely
to support deferring payment for current services until later at the expense of
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Excessive or abusive pension promises also occur due to the
nature of the relationship between government employees,
elected officials, and policymakers’ self-interest. Government
employees are often among the most ardent supporters of
incumbent politicians because such employees depend on
politicians for their jobs, levels of pay, and working conditions.86
In the age of patronage, the relationship between employees and
elected officials was quite direct because virtually all government
workers owed their jobs to some sort of connection to an elected
official. But even in this era in which civil service is the dominant
government employment system, patronage still exists at high
levels and in various pockets of government.87 Further, even if
only a small percentage of employees are in a close relationship
with elected officials, whatever system of pay and benefits is
created will normally be designed to cover everyone. In other
words, the desire to be generous to “connected” employees
contributes to excessive compensation for all employees. Finally,
in some situations, officials have the power to shape policies
governing their own pensions, which can also result in generous
promises that include themselves and other public employees.
In the pension area, the effects of close relationships between
politicians and employees can be quite direct. For example, in the
case discussed above involving the employee in Plymouth County,
Massachusetts, who worked two full-time jobs and claimed two
poorer, less mobile residents); see also Robert P. Inman, Municipal Pension
Funding: A Theory and Some Evidence by Dennis Epple and Katherine Schipper:
A Comment, 37 PUB. CHOICE 179, 180 (1981) (discussing the mobility of
taxpayers).
86. See Skeel, supra note 83, at 691, 711.
87. In Massachusetts, a scandal over patronage hiring at the state
probation department has led to federal indictments of several officials
including the former head of the department. It has been reported that federal
prosecutors are investigating whether state legislators who “recommended”
candidates to probation department jobs violated federal law in the process. See
Andreas Estes & Thomas Farragher, Ex-Probation Chief, 2 Aides Indicted in
Hiring Scandal: Accused of Rigging Selection Process for Job Applicants, BOS.
GLOBE, Mar. 24, 2012, at A1 (discussing an investigation of the hiring practices
of the probation commissioner and others); Andreas Estes & Scott Allen, DiMasi
Facing a Cancer Diagnosis; Ex-Speaker’s Illness Likely to be Treated at Prison
Medical Center, BOS. GLOBE, May 19, 2012, at A1, A12 (suggesting that the
investigation includes looking into whether state legislators violated federal
law).
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separate pensions, one of his employers, an elected county sheriff,
sat on the retirement board that approved one of the pensions.88
The employee had helped the sheriff’s election campaign.89 There
are thousands of similar relationships throughout state and local
government that undoubtedly influence compensation decisions.90
In short, before the recent spotlight that has shined on the
pension issue, from one perspective, the entire system may have
operated like an enormous conspiracy to capture as much of the
taxpayers’ money for retired workers as possible.
We now have two general ways of understanding why
government employees might be overcompensated and why an
important part of that compensation takes the form of unfunded
pension obligations. There are also particulars concerning how
unfunded pension promises developed that can illuminate this
problem. Political scientists and economists began looking at this
issue as long ago as the 1970s. One early view was that as
government employment became more professionalized and
wages increased, deferred compensation in the form of pensions
became very attractive at the same time that taxpayers
demanded increased services without really wanting to pay for
them.91 It also appears that at certain times public employee
unions placed a higher priority on current wages than on

88. See generally Carroll, supra note 81.
89. See Steve Bailey, Putting a Face on the Need to Reform, BOS. GLOBE,
June 7, 2006, at D1
The pension system is the way it is because those who oversee it[,]
the cops and firefighters who run the retirement boards[,] have it just
the way they like it. As the inspector general notes, Lincoln was no
accident. Former Plymouth County Sheriff Joseph McDonough, who
hired Lincoln for this three-year victory lap at the jail, knew how the
system worked. He is on the Plymouth County retirement board.
Lincoln, not coincidentally, helped on McDonough’s campaign in
2000.
90. Another good illustration is the ability of the state teachers’ union in
Rhode Island to convince the legislature to allow employees of the union to buy
into the state pension system, resulting in a 1,250% return on investment. See
Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 172
F.3d 22, 24–25 (1st Cir. 1999).
91. See Epple & Schipper, supra note 13, at 170. Interestingly, Epple and
Schipper suggest that public pension underfunding should decrease as the
school-aged population of baby boomers declines. Id.
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adequate funding of pension promises, even if this created some
risk of nonpayment in the future.92
Two additional historical factors have contributed to the
problem of pension funding. One factor is that in good economic
times, governments have tended to increase all forms of employee
compensation, including pension promises.93 Assuming a general
level of underfunding, a higher overall payroll is likely to produce
a higher level of underfunding. Another factor is that in tight
fiscal times, governments have foregone or reduced pension
contributions and used the money to fund other services.94 This is
not surprising because constituents’ demand for services may
actually increase in periods when funds are tight due to economic
downturn. State balanced budget requirements may contribute to
this aspect of the problem: Because borrowing to meet operating
expenses may not be available, underfunding pension obligations
becomes a necessary tool to balance the budget without making
drastic cuts to services.95 These two dynamics, increased promises
in boom times coupled with decreased funding in tough times, are
a recipe for fiscal disaster.
In sum, unfunded pension and health care promises to
retirees are, in a sense, the state and local version of the federal
deficit. Politicians have twin incentives at work: To defer
payment for current services to future generations of taxpayers
and to reward loyal supporters in the ranks of government
workers with handsome compensation packages, including
generous retirement benefits. Even if most government workers
are of little concern to politicians, the desire to reward the
92. See Olivia S. Mitchell & Robert S. Smith, Pension Funding in the Public
Sector, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 278, 282–83 (1994) (testing data on how public
pensions tend to be funded over time, allowing for several factors). Public
employee unions have challenged underfunding as violating their contractual or
constitutional rights, apparently out of concern that if the system is
underfunded, their pensions might not be paid in full.
93. See REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 22, at
40–41.
94. See Barbara A. Chaney, Paul A. Copley & Mary S. Stone, The Effect of
Fiscal Stress and Balanced Budget Requirements on the Funding and
Measurement of State Pension Obligations, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 287, 293
(2002) (examining “the extent to which fiscal stress and state balanced budget
restrictions affect the funding of state public employee retirement systems”).
95. See generally id.
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connected few (and often themselves) contributes to the
phenomenon of all boats rising together. Even legislators
themselves may need to establish an attractive pension system
for all government workers to justify their own generous
postservice compensation. Taxpayers may now be waking up, but
as we shall see in the discussion of legal constraints on pension
reform, it may be too late to avoid severe fiscal hardship.
III. State Law Constraints on Underfunding Pension Liabilities
and Pension Reform
Recent and continuing fiscal difficulties in many state and
local government entities have inspired searches for ways to save
money. Pensions are an obvious candidate, but even if state
legislatures were determined to reduce pension promises, state
contract law and state constitutional law designed to protect the
legitimate expectations of state and local employees may stand in
the way. In this part of the Article, I look at three state law issues
concerning pension reform: The effects of state balanced budget
requirements on pension funding, state law constraints on
underfunding pension contributions, and state contract and
constitutional law constraints on reducing pension benefits or
promises to workers not yet retired. As we shall see, state law can
pose significant impediments to pension reform.
A. State Balanced Budget Requirements and Pension Plan
Funding
In debates over fiscal policy, the fact that balanced budget
requirements exist in nearly every state96 is held up as evidence
96. State balanced budget requirements arise from constitutional
provisions, statutory provisions, and in a few cases from court decisions
interpreting financial provisions of state constitutions. See NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET
PROVISIONS 1, 8 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalanced
BudgetProvisions2010.pdf (describing the importance of state budgetary
provisions). For a general look at the effect of balanced budget requirements, see
Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, Do State Balanced Budget Requirements Matter?
Testing Two Explanatory Frameworks, 145 PUB. CHOICE 57, 57 (2010). This
study concludes that balanced budget requirements have effects on the
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that the federal government could and should follow suit and
balance its budget. This has been a cornerstone of the Tea Party
movement, and during 2011’s controversy over increasing the
federal government’s debt limit, there was a proposal to condition
the extension on Congress voting for a balanced budget
amendment to the federal Constitution.97 As we have seen,
however, the magnitude of unfunded state pension and health
care promises shows that states are not nearly as constrained as
might appear from the existence of balanced budget
requirements. This raises questions of whether the failure to fund
pension obligations constitutes unlawful deficit spending, and
whether such a violation would justify renunciation of some
portion of unfunded obligations.
The simple answer is that state failure to fund pension
liabilities is not considered a violation of state balanced budget
requirements. Further, in some states, competing constitutional
requirements prohibiting diminution of pension promises mean
that the weight of state constitutional law is more strongly on the
side of what is, in effect, deficit spending, than it is on the side of
fiscal constraint.
The first thing to understand about state balanced budget
requirements is that they are quite diverse and impose varying
levels of fiscal discipline. One important fact is that state
balanced budget requirements normally affect only state
operating budgets, not capital or long-term debt obligations.98
government and that the evidence is inconclusive on whether there is a
difference in effects between constitutional and statutory balanced budget
requirements. Id. at 78; see also James M. Poterba, Balanced Budget Rules and
Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the States, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 329, 329–34 (1995)
(considering state balanced budget requirements and the possibility of a federal
balanced budget law).
97. See Alan Fram, Balanced Budget Amendment Injected Into Debt Ceiling
Fight, HUFFINGTON POST (July 14, 2011, 6:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/07/14/balanced-budget-amendment_n_899301.html (last visited Feb.
2, 2013) (describing efforts to include a Balanced Budget Amendment as part of
a deal to raise the debt ceiling) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
98. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 2, at 6
(noting that “[s]tate budget processes focus on balancing state operating budgets
with less emphasis on balancing the rest of the state budget”). For a general
look at state balanced budget requirements, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-93-58, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1993).
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This means that states are free to finance capital projects with
long-term debt,99 which is sensible fiscal policy because current
taxpayers might be unwilling to fully finance projects with longterm benefits. Interest payments on long-term debt would
presumably be included in the operating budget, which must be
balanced each year, but there is no prohibition on incurring longterm debt. However, state constitutions often contain stringent
limits on the use of debt financing.100 Thus, the exclusion of longterm debt from balanced budget requirements does not
necessarily release states from the fiscal constraints under which
they would otherwise operate.
The Association of State Budget Officers reports that state
balanced budget requirements generally take three forms, with
many states operating under two or even all three of the
requirements: (1) The governor’s proposed budget must be
balanced; (2) The enacted budget must be balanced; and (3) No
deficit can be carried forward from one fiscal period into the
next.101 Further, some states require that the governor sign a
balanced budget.102 State constitutions and statutes do not
always explicitly require these steps, but some courts have read
them to exist.103
State balanced budget provisions also vary in the availability
of enforcement mechanisms.104 In a very few states, mandatory
99. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 2, at 7
(indicating that state governments generally do not consider debt obligations for
capital expenditures to violate a balanced budget “either because those
provisions specify a way that general obligation debt may be issued, or
because . . . judicial decisions have validated the issuance of other forms of
debt”).
100. See id. at 8–9 (indicating that states often place constitutional
requirements on budget balancing and that some states have specific
constitutional requirements for debt financing).
101. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE
STATES 40 (2008), http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/BP_2008. pdf, cited in
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 2, at 2–3.
102. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 2, at 5
(discussing North Dakota as an example of a state that requires the governor to
sign a balanced budget).
103. See id. at 9–10 (noting that some requirements for state budget
balancing have emerged from judicial decisions predicated upon constitutional
provisions that have little to do with budgetary matters).
104. See id. at 8–9 (discussing the various enforcement mechanisms that
state balanced budget provisions contain).
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spending reductions are required if expenditures would otherwise
exceed revenue.105 At least one state provides for criminal
punishment of officials who authorize deficit spending.106 In other
states, governors monitor expenditures and are required to make
cuts during the fiscal year to ensure that the budget remains in
balance.107 Some states may also simply prohibit the paying of
bills if funds have run out.108 Some states are more liberal,
allowing borrowing at the end of the fiscal year to satisfy
outstanding obligations.109 The overriding factor may be the
political culture of state government.110 Even in states with
uncertain enforcement, operating budgets remain balanced
because the political costs of running an illegal deficit would
simply be too high.
Ironically, state balanced budget requirements are negatively
correlated with pension funding to full actuarial standards.111 In
other words, states with strict balanced budget requirements are
less likely than other states to fully fund their projected future
pension obligations. The reason for this may be simple: When
balanced budget requirements are likely to be strictly enforced,
expenditures are moved to areas that do not constitute deficit
spending. Because pension promises are an off-budget method of
providing compensation to state employees for current services,
the larger the share that can be paid in the form of deferred
compensation, the more services government can provide out of
105. See id. at 9 (noting that Alabama and Oklahoma “require mandatory
reductions in expenditures to keep budgets in balance”).
106. See id. (“The state constitution [in Alabama] allows claims against
appropriations to become void at the end of the fiscal year if the treasury lacks
money to pay them. A treasurer who violates this provision is subject to a $5,000
fine, two years’ imprisonment in the state penitentiary, or both . . . .”).
107. See id. (indicating that “[a] substantial number of states allow or
require governors to reduce state spending when it is likely to exceed available
resources”).
108. See id. (noting that in Alabama the state constitution permits the
voiding of claims against appropriations if the treasury lacks the funds to pay
them).
109. See id. at 7–8 (describing states that allow borrowing from one fiscal
period to the next and the possible consequences of prolonged borrowing).
110. See id. (noting that the most important factor for most states’ budget
balancing is that a tradition of budget balancing has created intense political
pressure to continue balancing the budget).
111. See Chaney et al., supra note 94, at 307.
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current revenue. Further, in tight fiscal times, the tendency for
state governments to reduce or suspend pension funding for one
or more years112 to avoid serious cuts to current services can
aggravate pension fund deficits during bad economic times when
stock market downturns reduce pension fund investment values
and state tax revenue declines. 113
The relative freedom of states to determine their own
discount rates also contributes to the general underfunding of
pension obligations. States can tinker with pension growth
forecasts and discount rates to make it appear that they are
funding future obligations adequately or creating only a
relatively small funding gap when they decrease their
contributions to bridge budget gaps.114 These temporary budget
fixes contribute to cumulative problems because later budgets do
not make up for the earlier gap in funding. States may also issue
pension obligation bonds to meet required annual contribution
requirements, but this move passes the cost on to future
generations of taxpayers who must pay the bonds and may also
need additional funds to make up for underfunding due to
inflated discount rates.115 Thus, the short-term nature of state
budgeting and the inapplicability of “balanced budget”

112. See REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 22, at
37–38. The report contains a detailed discussion of state and local
underpayment of projected pension liabilities and reform efforts that may make
it more difficult in some states for government entities to continue underpaying.
This, in turn, would lead to more stress on already tight state and local budgets.
See id. at 40–41.
113. See THAD CALABRESE, SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, PUBLIC PENSIONS, PUBLIC
BUDGETS, AND THE RISKS OF PENSION OBLIGATION BONDS 3 (2010) (discussing how
pension fund deficits grow during times of economic downturn).
114. See id. at 4–8 (discussing the way that states can maintain the
appearance of adequately meeting pension funding obligations without actually
doing so); see also JOSH BARRO & STUART BUCK, MANHATTAN INST., UNDERFUNDED
TEACHER PENSION PLANS: IT’S WORSE THAN YOU THINK (2010),
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_61.pdf (noting that states have more
leeway than private entities to alter their discount rates because they generally
follow the pension standards set by the Governmental Accounting Standards
Board rather than the market-based standards established by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board).
115. See CALABRESE, supra note 113, at 7–11 (discussing the intricacies of
how issuing pension obligation bonds to meet annual contribution requirements
passes the cost to future taxpayers).
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requirements conspire to create a long-term mess of underfunded
pension obligations.
This should be discouraging to those who champion balanced
budget requirements as devices to bring fiscal constraint to
government. Underfunding future pension obligations shares
many of the vices of deficit spending and is different from longterm borrowing for capital projects because pension promises are
more like operating expenses than capital borrowing. While
deficit spending may make sense when economic stimulus is
desired, for programs that do not promise to grow the economy for
the future, it is a simple intergenerational wealth transfer, with
current taxpayers pushing off the expense of providing current
government services to future taxpayers. For the most part,
pension promises fall into this category. Generous, secure pension
promises allow government employers to pay their employees less
in current cash compensation. Underfunding pension obligations
means that future taxpayers will essentially pay the bill for
services provided in the past without any current benefit, such as
a building, park, or highway, which is still being used while bond
payments are made. An effective state balanced budget
requirement would thus include advance funding (under realistic
projections and discount rates) of pension and retiree health care
promises to public employees as part of the current operating
expenses required, under state law, to be part of a balanced
budget.
B. State Law Limitations on Pension Reform116
In many states, the weight of constitutional law is with state
employees rather than the taxpaying public.117 In a
116. Although state statutory and constitutional protections of public
pensions are distinct from federal law, except in states with very specific
constitutional protections for pension promises, the considerations state judges
use to decide whether to protect pensions under state law are very similar to the
considerations they use to determine whether a reform violates the federal
Contracts Clause. Generally, once a state court finds that an employee has a
contractual right to a feature of a pension plan, the court finds a violation of
either state pension provisions or federal constitutional law.
117. For a general discussion of the legal status of public pension reform, see
David L. Gregory, The Problematic Status of Employee Compensation and
Retiree Pension Security: Resisting the State, Reforming the Corporation, 5 B.U.
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comprehensive review of state pension plan protections, Amy
Monahan has demonstrated that many states protect pension
plan participants from significant modifications to their plans
under both constitutional and contract law theories.118 In another
article, Monahan reports that “courts in California and the twelve
other states that have adopted California’s precedent have held
not only that state retirement statutes create contracts, but that
they do so as of the first day of employment.”119 Jonathan Forman
concludes that state law places serious constraints on pension
reform with regard to existing workers: “Through state
constitutional provisions and court interpretations of property
and contract rights, most states essentially guarantee that their
public workers will get the pensions that they were promised
when they were hired.”120
Some state constitutions contain provisions that explicitly
prohibit the state from reducing pension payments or pension
promises to state employees. For example, the New York
constitution provides that “[a]fter July first, nineteen hundred
forty, membership in any pension or retirement system of the
state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired.”121 This has been interpreted to protect the level of
benefits promised as of the date that the employee became
eligible to participate in the pension plan.122 The Illinois
constitution contains a very similar provision, which has been
PUB. INT. L.J. 37 (1995).
118. See generally Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal
Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617 (2010) [hereinafter Monahan, Public
Pension Plan Reform].
119. Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and its
Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2012)
[hereinafter Monahan, Statutes as Contracts]. Monahan is highly critical of this
line of cases, finding it to be inconsistent with more general legal principles
concerning flexibility in government regulatory programs. For further
discussion, see infra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
120. Forman, supra note 39, at 866.
121. N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7.
122. See Kleinfelt v. N.Y.C. Emp. Ret. Sys., 324 N.E.2d 865, 869 (N.Y. 1975)
(interpreting the constitutional amendment to protect the level of benefits
promised at the time of entering retirement system membership); McCaffrey v.
Bd. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 368 N.Y.S.2d 863, 863 (App. Div. 1975)
(same).
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interpreted to preclude the Illinois legislature from unilaterally
cutting pension benefits to current employees.123 Similarly, the
Michigan constitution provides that “[t]he accrued financial
benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state
and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation
thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.”124
States with provisions like these may be unable to reduce pension
payments or promises to state workers even if the magnitude and
nature of pension promises is in serious tension with state
balanced budget requirements. It should also be noted that many
state courts use the federal Contract Clause to protect pension
promises, finding first a contractual relationship under state law,
and then protecting employee rights under federal constitutional
law.125
Most states recognize that public pension rights vest at some
point, after which the state is precluded from amending the
contractual promises. The most common point at which rights are
solidified under state law is when an employee satisfies the
requirements for grant of the pension, commonly referred to as
“vesting,” which usually occurs at some point after the onset of
employment and before retirement.126 Some states’ laws are even
123. See Eric M. Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pensions an Option for
Illinois? An Analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution (Mar. 1,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1774163.
Madiar is the Chief Legal Counsel to the Illinois Senate President. Id. at 1. A
principal aim of his article was to refute a legal opinion by the Chicago law firm
Sidley & Austin that supported a report of the Civic Committee of the
Commercial Club of Chicago suggesting to the Illinois General Assembly that
the State of Illinois could unilaterally reduce its pension promises and thereby
cut its unfunded pension liability by $20 billion. Id. at 42.
124. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
125. See, e.g., Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. State, 918 P.2d 765, 768 (Or.
1996) (holding that state constitutional amendments altering employee
contribution amounts, prohibiting guaranteed rates of return on pension funds,
and prohibiting inclusion of unused sick leave in pension calculations violated
Contract Clause rights of employees); Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467,
477 (Kan. 1980) (holding that changes in retirement benefits promises violated
contractually protected rights and therefore violated the federal Contract
Clause).
126. Many decisions recognize vested rights in dicta while denying claims
brought by employees who sue over pension reform before they are actually
eligible to retire. See, e.g., Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trustees, 464 A.2d 894,
896 (Del. 1983) (noting that while “vested contractual rights were held by those
employees and former employees who satisfied the eligibility requirements for a
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more favorable toward employees, recognizing pension rights
from the onset of government employment. Courts in these states
reason that “by accepting the job and continuing work, the
employee has accepted the State’s offer of retirement benefits,
and the State may not impair or abrogate that contract without
offering consideration and obtaining the consent of the
employee.”127
Some states take a reliance interest approach to the question
of whether an employee has a vested right to pension benefits
that is protected under constitutional or contractual principles.128
For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court has reasoned:
pension,” the teacher in this case possessed no contractual right to receive credit
for time spent teaching in other states because the teacher’s pension rights had
not yet vested when the state legislature amended its credit policy); Baker v.
Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 718 P.2d 348, 353 (Okla. 1986)
(indicating that only those firefighters and police officers “who had retired or
who could have retired and become eligible for payment of pension benefits”
possessed pension rights that the state legislature could not detrimentally
change with subsequent legislation); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Cary, 373 So. 2d
841, 842–43 (Ala. 1979) (deciding that once retirement rights have vested the
benefits to which the person is entitled at vesting may not later be reduced);
Pyle v. Webb, 489 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Ark. 1973) (concluding that the legislature
cannot remove the qualifications of a member of the Teachers’ Retirement
System once that member qualifies for an annuity); Police Pension & Relief Bd.
v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694, 700 (Colo. 1959) (“Until an employee has earned his
retirement pay, or until the time arrives when he may retire, his retirement pay
is but an inchoate right . . . .” (citation omitted)); City of Jacksonville Beach v.
State ex rel. O’Donald, 151 So. 2d 430, 431–33 (Fla. 1963) (holding that a
spouse’s right to receive pension benefits following the working spouse’s death,
once vested, may not be constitutionally denied); Campbell v. Mich. Judges Ret.
Bd., 143 N.W.2d 755, 756–58 (Mich. 1966) (concerning voluntary pension
contributions); Hickey v. Pension Bd., 106 A.2d 233, 238 (Pa. 1954) (holding that
once vesting occurs a subsequent legislative action cannot amend the pension
rights due at vesting); Ellis v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 757 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah
1988); Leonard v. City of Seattle, 503 P.2d 741, 746 (Wash. 1972) (en banc)
(explaining that “[e]ven before ripening finally, and during the years of its
accrual, it was more than an expectancy and more than an enforceable promise
or a contract; it gave him steadily accruing rights in and to the pension fund
itself”). But see Brown v. City of Highland Park, 30 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Mich.
1948) (asserting that where public employee membership in pension systems is
mandatory, the accompanying pension benefits are not a part of the contract of
employment and can be amended by the legislature).
127. Proska v. Ariz. State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 74 P.3d 939, 942 (Ariz.
2003).
128. For an argument that reliance should be the key issue in Contract
Clause jurisprudence, see Robert A. Graham, Note, The Constitution, The
Legislature, and Unfair Surprise: Toward A Reliance-Based Approach to the
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When considering the constitutionality of legislative
amendments to pension plans, an employee’s eligibility for a
pension does not determine whether he or she has vested
contract rights. Instead, the determination of an employee’s
vested contract rights concerns whether the employee has
sufficient years of service in the system that he or she can be
considered to have relied substantially to his or her detriment
on the existing pension benefits and contribution schedules.129

With sufficient length of service, reliance is presumed,130 but only
on those provisions that are in effect during the lengthy service.
This approach to determining whether the state may alter
pension benefits requires that the court determine in each case
whether the employee has relied on the particular provision that
has been altered, especially with regard to provisions that were
not in effect during the entire period of employment. For
example, in 1988, the West Virginia legislature amended that
state’s public pension statute to include lump-sum payments for
unused vacation time in retiring employees’ final salary for
pension calculations.131 Apparently many employees took early
retirement shortly after the amendment passed so they could
take advantage of this method of increasing their pension
payments.132 Then, in 1989, the legislature repealed the
provision.133 When one employee retired in 1996, he sought to
have a lump-sum payment for his unused vacation time included
in his final salary for pension purposes even though the provision
allowing this had been repealed in 1989.134 The trial court
dismissed the employee’s claim, but the West Virginia Supreme
Court ruled that he was entitled to an opportunity to prove his
allegation that in 1988 he made a decision to continue his
employment with the State in reliance upon the 1988 version of
the retirement statute, expected that he would be able to add his
Contract Clause, 92 MICH. L. REV. 398 (1993).
129. Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 181 (W. Va. 1995).
130. See id. at 184 (concluding that “after 10 years of state service
detrimental reliance is presumed”).
131. Myers v. W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd., 704 S.E.2d 738, 743 (W. Va.
2010).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Adams v. Ireland, 528 S.E.2d 197, 200–01 (W. Va. 1999).
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accrued but unpaid leave to his final average salary when he
retired, and would thereby receive an increased monthly
retirement benefit.135
Without specific evidence of reliance, the particular pension
benefit would not be vested and the state would be able to
eliminate or modify it. For example, when two employees retired
in the late 1990s, they also sought to have lump-sum payments
for unused vacation time included in their final salaries on the
basis that they relied on the 1988 provision by remaining
employed by the state for ten years after the 1988 amendment
was adopted.136 The West Virginia Supreme Court denied the
claim, concluding that reliance on a provision that was in effect
for only one year cannot be presumed, and
neither [plaintiff] presented any specific evidence indicating
that they relied to their detriment on this specific
provision . . . . [N]either of the Appellees in this case was
eligible to retire during the year this benefit was in effect and,
thus, . . . neither of the Appellees could have based any
retirement decision on the promise contained in the 1988
amendment. Indeed, neither Appellee introduced any evidence
to show that he made any decision whatsoever on the basis of
that particular promised benefit.137

Although, as Monahan reports, California protects pension
promises from the first day of employment,138 some California
decisions take a nuanced view of reliance, balancing employees’
interest in pension benefits against the state’s need for flexibility
and control.139 The California Supreme Court has stated that
“[t]he employee does not obtain, prior to retirement, any absolute
right to fixed or specific benefits, but only to a ‘substantial or
reasonable pension.’”140 It is unclear, however, how far this
apparent flexibility goes because California cases also state that
135. Id. at 201.
136. Myers, 704 S.E.2d at 743–44.
137. Id. at 750–51.
138. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts, supra note 119, at 1032.
139. See id. at 1058 (discussing the California decisions that balanced
employees’ pension rights against the state need for flexibility and control and
held it permissible “to eliminate future benefit accruals once a minimum
pension had been earned”).
140. Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 582 P.2d 614, 617 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Wallace
v. City of Fresno, 265 P.2d 884, 886 (Cal. 1954)).
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normally any reduction in pension benefits must be compensated
for by other aspects of the reform provisions.141 Further, there are
California cases that appear to mechanically enforce provisions of
pension laws in effect during employment, even when the results
may be seen as abusive double increases in benefits.142
In addition to the contract-based protections employees
enjoy, labor law may provide another layer of protection. State
and local governments may not be able to unilaterally alter
pension benefits for employees in bargaining units engaged in
collective bargaining. Because retiree benefits are often specified
in collective bargaining agreements, any unilateral attempt to
alter them may be considered a breach of contract, no matter how
weighty the government interest behind the need for reform.143
Thus, for unionized sectors, reform may depend on successful
collective bargaining.
In some states, the law goes further than protecting benefit
levels and also protects funding levels, requiring an actuarially
adequate level of annual contributions to pension funds.144 For
example, in elaborating on state statutes that create contractual
guarantees in pension benefits to public employees, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals stated, “[I]t is clear that Plaintiffs had
a contractual right to the funding of the Retirement System in an
actuarially sound manner. Therefore, we hold that the right to
have the Retirement System funded in an actuarially sound
manner is a term or condition included in Plaintiffs’ retirement
141. See Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955)
(requiring that “changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to
employees should be accompanied by comparable new advantages”). Because of
relatively strict application of this requirement, Monahan views the California
decisions as much more favorable to employees than the language from Betts
might imply. See Monahan, Statutes as Contracts, supra note 119, at 1062–64
(discussing cases strictly applying the requirement that changes resulting in
disadvantages should also include new advantages).
142. See Betts, 582 P.2d at 619 (noting that petitioner receives a double
increase in benefits and concluding that the legislature must have intended
such a result for “constitutional officers serving between 1963 and 1974 because
it left in effect both of the formulae during that 11-year period”).
143. See City of Phila. v. Dist. Council 33, 598 A.2d 256, 259–60 (Pa. 1991)
(noting that the city imposition of a new pension scheme breached a collective
bargaining agreement and possibly unconstitutionally impaired a contract).
144. For a discussion of cases involving funding levels, see Simko, supra
note 82, at 1065–79.
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contracts.”145 The North Carolina court cited decisions from
several other jurisdictions for the proposition that actuarially
sound funding can be a contractually protected term of a pension
program.146
Other states recognize that the legislature should have
discretion over funding decisions and protect only the ultimate
pension payments and not the funding of pension funds. For
example, in Illinois, pension participants and the funds
themselves challenged a statute that changed the method of
calculating government contributions to pension funds.147 They
argued that the new statute violated the Illinois Constitution’s
pension protection provision: “Membership in any pension or
retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or
school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be
an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which
shall not be diminished or impaired.”148 The Illinois Supreme
Court held that this provision relates only to benefits and not to
the “politically sensitive area of pension funding.”149
145. Stone v. State, 664 S.E.2d 32, 40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
146. See Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 773 (Ct. App. 1983); Sgaglione v.
Levitt, 337 N.E.2d 592 (N.Y. 1975); Stone, 664 S.E.2d at 40 (citing Municipality
of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997)); Dombrowski v. City of
Phila., 245 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1968); Weaver v. Evans, 495 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1972);
Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1988); State Teachers’ Ret. Bd. v.
Giessel, 106 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 1960). Any attempt to move to actuarially
adequate funding may be impossible or extremely difficult for many states. See
PEW CENTER, PROMISES, supra note 18, at 48–52 (discussing the difficulties of
moving to actuarially adequate funding).
147. McNamee v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (Ill. 1996).
148. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
149. McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1163; see also People ex rel. Ill. Fed’n of
Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749, 750–52 (Ill. 1975) (noting that the
Governor reduced pension appropriation but that “it cannot be said that under
the circumstances this constitutional provision affords plaintiffs the right to
judicially circumvent the Governor’s actions”). The court cited cases in which it
had invalidated legislation that reduced pension benefits, but declined to follow
a New York case that protected funding levels. See McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at
1165 (citing Felt v. Bd. of Trustees of Judges Ret. Sys., 481 N.E.2d 698 (Ill.
1985); Buddell v. Bd. of Trustees, State Univ. Ret. Sys. of Ill., 514 N.E.2d 184
(Ill. 1987)). The plaintiffs had urged the court to follow McDermott v. Regan, 624
N.E.2d 985 (N.Y. 1993), in which the New York Court of Appeals had
invalidated a provision removing the New York comptroller’s power to require
actuarially adequate contributions to pension funds. See also Jones v. Bd. of
Trustees of Ky. Ret. Sys., 910 S.W.2d 710, 714–16 (Ky. 1995) (noting that the
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Judicial insistence on adequate funding would prevent some
of the most serious missteps that have contributed to the funding
crisis.150 It would reduce the tendency of states to use pension
obligations as a form of deficit spending, pushing off payment for
current services onto future taxpayers. Underfunding of pension
funds is sometimes systematic, as when states use unrealistic
projected rates of return on pension funds to justify
underfunding; and sometimes it is episodic, as when states decide
to cut pension contributions to balance the state budget during
difficult fiscal times.151 While legitimate questions can be raised
over whether the courts should prevent the government from
allocating funds as it sees fit, judicial compulsion in this context
may be the least of several potential evils.
It should not be surprising that the law in many states is
very protective of public employees’ and retirees’ pension
state legislature had the power to amend method of calculating public employer
contribution to retirement fund without unconstitutionally impairing contracts).
150. Some full funding requirements may go too far. The United States
Postal Service is legally required to fund its pension and retiree health care
obligations in advance. This has proven to be a hardship to the Postal Service,
and due to its general downturn in business, it failed to make two payments in
2012, totaling $11.1 billion. See Ron Nixon, Postal Service Reports Loss of $15
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A22 (“[B]ecause of revenue losses, the post
office was for the first time forced to default on these payments, which were due
in August and October.”).
151. For example, the challenge in Stone v. State resulted from an executive
order issued by North Carolina’s Governor diverting pension contributions to
balance the budget. See Stone v. State, 664 S.E.2d 32, 40 (N.C. App. 2008). It
appears common that in difficult fiscal times, pension contributions are reduced.
From the perspective of the government employee, using underfunding as a
reason for cutting benefits may appear to be manipulative. Legislators promise
generous pension benefits knowing they will underfund them and be able to use
the underfunding later as an excuse for reform. This conspiracy theory may be
far-fetched in the amount of the advance planning it entails, but it may not
seem so to the public employee suffering cuts to promised benefits. Zach Carter’s
Huffington Post article accuses conservative state governors of creating the
pension funding crisis to finance tax cuts and justify pension reductions to state
workers. See Carter, supra note 16. Regarding New Jersey, Carter reports that
During the 1990s, under Gov. Christine Todd Whitman (R), the state
slashed its annual pension contributions in order to finance a slate of
tax cuts, and didn’t begin seriously boosting those contributions until
2007. . . . Last year, Gov. Chris Christie (R) took a page from
Whitman’s playbook, forgoing the $3 billion annual state contribution
to the pension plan while pushing $1 billion in tax cuts for the state’s
wealthiest citizens.
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expectations. For the most part, the employees have traditional
contract principles on their side, and in the typical case, they
have legitimately relied on their employers’ retirement promises.
These state courts recognize that it would be grossly unfair to
employees if their retirement savings were subject to the political
and fiscal winds that might lead state and local legislative bodies
to make significant cuts to their pensions.152
IV. Federal Constitutional Law Constraints on State Pension
Reform
Assuming that state law allows it, the next issue to explore
concerns federal constitutional constraints on state pension
reform. The primary federal constitutional provision that
restrains states here is the Contract Clause, which prohibits
states from passing “any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.”153 Additionally, the Takings Clause154 may limit
states’ ability to reduce pension payments to some state workers.
A. The Contract Clause and Pension Reform
There has been a good deal of litigation in both state and
federal courts concerning the application of the Contract Clause

152. But see ALICIA H. MUNNELL & LAURA QUINBY, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH
BOS. COLL., LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON CHANGES IN STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS 3
(2012), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/slp_25.pdf, for a report
arguing for a sharp distinction between benefits earned for past service and
benefits expected based on future service. Their main argument in favor of
flexibility is that public pension benefits should be subject to the same economic
considerations as private pensions. Id. In general, private companies can reduce
pension promises prospectively—while pension promises based on past service
may not be reduced, pension promises based on future service can be reduced
along with other elements of future compensation. Id. The authors of the report
recognize that in some states, this would require a constitutional amendment.
Id. Munnell and Quinby’s treatment is more balanced than that of some
analysts who do not seem to recognize the legitimate reliance interests
government workers have in their pension benefits.
153. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
154. Id. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
AT
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to state pension reform.155 It was understood from very early on
that the Contract Clause applied both to state laws impairing
private contracts and state laws impairing the obligation of the
state’s own contracts.156 However, in the early cases, the Supreme
Court did not view legislative pension promises as contractual in
nature and thus refused to protect them under the Due Process
Clause157 or the Contract Clause.158 In neither case, however, did
the Court categorically rule out protecting the pension promises.
In the later of the cases, which more closely resembles the
current approach under the Contract Clause, the Court found no
contractual right to pension promises based largely on decisions
of the Illinois Supreme Court, which found that the legislation in
question was not intended to preclude subsequent revision of the
plan involved.159
Although at one time it might have seemed that the primary
focus of the Contract Clause was on state regulation of private
155. Early Supreme Court decisions on this subject are not favorable to
pension plan participants’ claims. In 1889, the Court characterized public
pensions as gratuities that could be withdrawn at any time. Pennie v. Reis, 132
U.S. 464, 471–72 (1889). Later, the Court held that a new statute reducing
payments under a prior statute to those already receiving their pensions did not
violate the Contract Clause. See Dodge v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 302 U.S.
74, 81 (1937). Neither of these cases has been overruled, and in fact Dodge was
cited with approval as recently as 1985. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985). However, due to
the significant changes to the law governing constitutional protection of state
benefits over the last fifty years, it would be unwise to treat the issues
addressed in this Article as settled by those decisions. For further discussion,
see Public Employee Pensions, supra note 13, at 996.
156. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 137–39 (1810) (applying Contract
Clause to grant of land by the state of Georgia).
157. See Pennie, 132 U.S. at 471–72 (1889) (stating that the abolition of
pension plans and transfers of funds deducted from employees’ paychecks to
other purposes does not violate pension plan beneficiaries’ due process rights).
158. See Dodge, 302 U.S. at 81 (deciding that a legislative pension promise
described as an “annuity” within the statute at issue does not merit protection
under the Contract Clause).
159. See id. (basing its decision heavily on the reasoning of the Illinois
Supreme Court). Note that this decision predates the provision of the 1970
Illinois constitution that protects pension benefits. See ILL. CONST., art. XIII, § 5;
Felt v. Bd. of Trustees, 481 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ill. 1985) (noting that the 1970
Illinois constitution protects pension benefits by creating a contractual
relationship between public employees and the state which the state cannot
impair or diminish).
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contracts, more recently, the Supreme Court, recognizing the
potential for state and local governments to use their sovereign
immunity to take advantage of contractual partners, has stated
that the Contract Clause applies more strictly to states’ own
contracts than to private contracts.160 The First Circuit has
observed that stricter scrutiny of impairments to the state’s own
contracts can be attributed to the fact that “‘the State’s selfinterest is at stake.’”161
The Contract Clause, however, is not understood today as an
absolute bar on laws altering state pension obligations (and other
state promises).162 Beginning in the 1930s, the Supreme Court
adopted a relatively lenient view of the Contract Clause, allowing
states great latitude in passing economic legislation that might
have previously been viewed as impairing the obligation of
contracts.163 The standard that has developed in the federal
courts to decide whether pension reform violates the Contract
Clause has two elements: (1) Whether the change in state law
160. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977)
(noting that unlike determining whether a state may impair a private contract,
when determining whether a state may impair a state contract “complete
deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not
appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake”).
161. Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S. Trust Co.
of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 26).
162. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 25 (“The Contract Clause is not
an absolute bar to subsequent modification of a State’s own financial
obligations. As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an
impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose.” (citation omitted)). It may be that under the original
understanding of the Contract Clause, all retrospective modifications of
contractual obligations would be considered unconstitutional. See Douglas W.
Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original
Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 526 (1987) (“Correctly
interpreted, the Contract Clause prohibits all retrospective, redistributive
legislation which violates vested contractual rights by transferring all or part of
the benefit of the bargain from one contracting party to another.”). However, as
the authors point out, the Clause is not so understood by the Supreme Court
today. Id.
163. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 41
(1940) (upholding state legislation limiting the withdrawal of bank shares
against a challenge that it violated the Contract Clause); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (holding that certain portions of a state
law providing mortgage relief through judicial proceedings did not violate the
Contract Clause).
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results in a “substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship,”164 and if so, (2) whether this impairment is justified
as “‘reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose.’”165 Thus, there must be both a contractual relationship
and a substantial impairment, and even when that is present, an
important public purpose is sufficient to uphold the
impairment.166
The second element, allowing impairment to be justified as
“reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose,”
reads like a form of intermediate scrutiny. The state law must be
more than merely rationally believed to serve a legitimate
purpose, which would be the test under the lowest level of
constitutional scrutiny.
The first element, whether there has been a substantial
impairment of a contractual relationship, can itself be divided
into three separate inquiries: First, whether a contractual
relationship exists; second, whether any such relationship has
been impaired; and third, whether any impairment is
substantial.167
When determining whether a protected contractual
relationship exists, courts are very sensitive to states’ interest in
remaining flexible and retaining their full regulatory authority.
This judicial instinct in the United States dates back at least to
the famous Charles River Bridge case168 in which the Supreme
Court held that a company operating a toll bridge under a state
charter could not prevent the state from chartering another
bridge which, when its tolls expired a few years after opening,

164. Parker, 123 F.3d at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)).
165. Id. (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 25); see also Energy
Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1982)
(employing the same standard). Some courts have discussed this test as having
three prongs. See, e.g., McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996)
(describing this framework as “a tripartite test for use in analyzing alleged
impairments of contracts”).
166. For a detailed examination of Contract Clause protection of public
pensions, see Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform, supra note 118.
167. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).
168. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. 420 (1837).
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would drive the first bridge out of business.169 In the course of
determining that the Charles River Bridge operators did not have
an exclusive franchise over river crossings in the area, the Court
expressed concern that a contrary finding would prevent state
governments from acting in the public interest. As Chief Justice
Taney stated in his opinion for the Court rejecting an implied
intention of the state to create a binding exclusive contract:
[S]till less will it be found, where sovereign rights are
concerned, and where the interests of a whole community
would be deeply affected by such an implication. It would,
indeed, be a strong exertion of judicial power, acting upon its
own views of what justice required, and the parties ought to
have done, to raise, by a sort of judicial coercion, an implied
contract . . . .170

Early cases refusing to recognize vested rights in pension
payments clearly rested their analysis on the need to preserve
regulatory flexibility over pension payments to retired state
workers. Just as Congress remains free to adjust the Social
Security program by increasing the retirement age, delaying or
reducing cost of living allowances, increasing payroll tax
deductions, imposing income tax on benefits payments, and even
reducing benefits payments, the Supreme Court has recognized
state flexibility in pension terms. As the Court stated very clearly
in 1985, the presumption against finding a contractual obligation
in pension promises
is grounded in the elementary proposition that the principal
function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make
laws that establish the policy of the state. Indiana ex rel.
Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 104–105 (1938). Policies,
unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and repeal,
and to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not
clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit
drastically the essential powers of a legislative body. Indeed,
“‘[t]he continued existence of a government would be of no
great value, if by implications and presumptions, it was
disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its
creation.’” Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 397 (1944) (quoting
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420,
548 (1837)). Thus, the party asserting the creation of a
169.
170.

Id. at 552.
Id. at 550.
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contract must overcome this well-founded presumption, Dodge,
supra, 302 U.S., at 79, and we proceed cautiously both in
identifying a contract within the language of a regulatory
statute and in defining the contours of any contractual
obligation.171

In light of these concerns, the courts have developed a
strong, clear statement for determining whether a contractual
relationship with the state exists.172 The standard in this area
has been referred to as the “unmistakability doctrine,”173
requiring that the state’s intent to be contractually bound be
“‘expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken.’”174 The purposes
of the unmistakability doctrine are to preserve state flexibility
in the exercise of sovereign power and to avoid the difficult
constitutional questions that arise if a contractual obligation is
found.175 Due to the strong presumption against finding a
171. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co.,
470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985).
172. A related doctrine, the “sovereign acts doctrine,” protects similar
interests. As explained by Joshua Schwartz:
These doctrines preserve the government’s ability to respond
effectively to changed circumstances that call for a policy response
without undue inhibition because of the collateral effects such a
response may have upon subsisting government contracts. At the
same time, these rules of law should be framed so as to provide
appropriate protection to the reliance and expectation interests of the
government’s contractual partners. Indeed, the government shares a
long-range interest in achieving a legal regime in which the risks
borne by its contractors do not stand as a barrier to entry into a
competitive market for government contracts. Finally, in striking a
balance between governmental and contractors’ interests, the
sovereign acts and unmistakability doctrines must also maintain the
constitutional separation of powers among the branches of the federal
government.
Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalism
in Government Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 635 (1996).
173. See Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the
“threshold requirement for the recognition of public contracts has been referred
to as the ‘unmistakability doctrine’”).
174. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Winstar Corp, 518 U.S. 839, 875
(1996)).
175. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 871–91 (1996).
Justice Souter’s plurality opinion in Winstar relied upon the purposes of the
unmistakability doctrine to argue that the strength of the doctrine should be
calibrated to reflect the extent to which a particular contract limits sovereign
powers. Id. 878–81. Contracts that would limit important powers such as the
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contractual obligation, there are no clear standards governing the
determination.176 Rather, all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding each alleged contract must be closely examined to
determine whether the state legislature intended to create a
contractual relationship.177
It is not altogether clear that the analogy between public
pension benefits and cases like Charles River Bridge and even
Social Security reform legislation is apt. Unlike the typical
regulatory program, pension benefits are earned through
government employment and, especially with regard to past
services, are compensation for work already performed. In
employment situations, perhaps the presumption should be
flipped—it ought to be presumed that promises made based on
employment are intended to be contractual.178 Otherwise, state
taxing power should be subject to a strict unmistakability doctrine while
“humdrum supply contracts” should not. Id. at 880. For a look at the
implications of Winstar, see generally Joshua I. Schwartz, The Status of the
Sovereign Acts Doctrine and Unmistakability Doctrines in the Wake of Winstar:
An Interim Report, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1177 (2000).
176. The high bar to finding a contractual obligation stands in contrast to
the relatively easier time government workers and government benefits
recipients have in establishing property interests in their jobs or benefits. Under
the test developed under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
government benefits and employment are considered property under federal law
whenever ascertainable standards govern their award and termination. Id. at
576. Accrued pension benefits are almost certainly property under federal law,
despite outdated decisions such as Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889), which
characterize public pensions as mere gratuities. Id. at 470–71. A finding that a
pension promise is property would not, however, prevent the government from
legislatively removing protections or depriving the employee of benefits for legal
cause following a constitutionally adequate process. This may explain why the
Court has made it more difficult to find a contractual obligation than a property
interest. The Contract Clause provides substantive protection to the contractual
interest, which means regardless of the procedure, it cannot be taken away. By
contrast, due process prohibits only deprivations accomplished without due
process of law.
177. See Parker, 123 F.3d at 4 (concluding “that a blanket answer to the
issue of Contract Clause protection for vested employees is not possible,
because . . . a detailed examination of the particular provisions of a state
pension program will be required prior to determining the nature and scope of
the unmistakable contractual rights”).
178. Emily Johnson and Ernest Young conclude in a recent article that the
Contract Clause may be a serious impediment to pension reform. Emily D.
Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 131–32 (2012).
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and local employers would be free to take advantage of employees
in exactly the way that the Contract Clause, as applied to the
government’s own contracts, is supposed to prevent. Further,
allowing state and local governments complete freedom to alter
employee benefits retroactively could hamper public employers’
ability to attract high quality employees or reduce employers’
flexibility regarding the timing of pay and benefits if employees
refuse to accept insecure promises of deferred compensation.
With regard to Social Security, even though benefits are based on
contributions, the case for allowing reform is still much stronger
than in the government employment situation. People are likely
to understand that Social Security is a government benefits
program subject to legislative change.
The high bar against finding a contractual obligation in
pension contracts is illustrated by the First Circuit’s decision in
Parker v. Wakelin,179 a case involving statutory amendments to
Maine’s public employee retirement laws.180 The amendments,
enacted in 1993, made several changes to the pension system that
were unfavorable to employees.181 Some of the changes applied to
all employees182 while others applied only to those employees
with less than ten years of creditable service.183 The changes that
affected all employees included an increase in the required
employee contribution to the pension plan (from 6.5% to 7.65%), a
cap on salary increases that may be used in calculating pension
benefits, and a six-month delay in a retiree’s first cost of living
increase. For employees with less than ten years of service, the
minimum full pension retirement age was increased from 60 to
62, the penalty for retiring early was increased from 2.25% of the
pension benefit to 6% of the pension benefit for each year before

179. Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
180. Id. at 2 (“The question presented by this appeal is whether certain
legislative amendments to the Maine State Retirement System (‘MSRS’) violate
the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution . . . .”).
181. See id. at 3 (discussing the changes made to Maine’s public employment
retirement scheme).
182. See id. (indicating that “three changes apply to the pensions
of all current teacher-members”).
183. See id. (noting that three changes applied only to those having less
than ten years of creditable service).
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age 62, and the ability of employees to include unused sick and
vacation pay in calculating pension benefits was eliminated.184
While many state courts treat pension promises as unilateral
contracts that are entered into when the employee begins
working,185 the First Circuit explicitly rejected a blanket rule
treating all pensions that way.186 Instead it chose to closely
analyze Maine law to determine whether the State of Maine
intended to bind itself to the pension promises made to employees
as embodied in the statutory provisions as they existed before the
amendments.187 The most significant indication of contractual
intent on the part of the Maine legislature was a statute enacted
in 1975 which states: “No amendment to this chapter shall cause
any reduction in the amount of benefits which would be due to
the member based on creditable service, compensation, employee
contributions and the provisions of this chapter on the date
immediately preceding the effective date of such amendment.”188
This is a typical provision found in state law to protect public
employee pensions. The question is whether it satisfies the
unmistakability doctrine’s standard for finding intent to create a
binding contract to maintain pension benefits as of the date a
public employee was hired, i.e., whether it creates a contractual
obligation.

184. See id. at 3 nn.3–4 (discussing ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 5,
§§ 17001(13)(B), 17001-B, 17701(13)(C), 17851(1-A) & (2-A), 17852(3-A),
17806(3) (2010)).
185. See, e.g., Yeazel v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 545 (Ariz. 1965) (finding a
contractual obligation in the terms of the legislation in effect at the time
employee entered employment); Halpin v. Neb. State Patrolmen’s Ret. Sys., 320
N.W.2d 910, 914–15 (Neb. 1982) (deciding that the alteration in pension
calculation method violated the Contract Clause); Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. &
Univ. Faculties v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 479 A.2d 962, 965–66 (Pa. 1984)
(noting that “the state’s unilateral reduction of retirement benefits arising from
the employment contracts cannot pass constitutional muster and must fall”).
186. Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (“We now conclude that
a blanket answer to the issue of Contract Clause protection for vested employees
is not possible . . . .”).
187. Id. at 8. The Third Circuit has held that even in Pennsylvania where
the state courts view pension promises as contractual, no contractual right
exists if the pension plan explicitly provides that administrators have the power
to make alterations to the plan. See Transp. Workers Union of Am., Local 290
ex. rel. Fabio v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 145 F.3d 619, 624 (3d Cir. 1998).
188. P.L. 1975, ch. 622, § 6, codified at ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 17801 (2010).
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In Parker, the district court had found that no changes could
be made to the potential benefits of Maine employees with
enough service to retire before the changes took effect, but that
the benefits of employees with some service but not enough to
retire could be reduced.189 The court of appeals viewed the
question as turning on the meaning of the word “due” in the 1975
statute quoted above.190 If due means what would be payable if
the employee retired, then the promise was contractual and the
state could not alter the terms of the pension plan.191 If, however,
the word due refers to amounts actually due and owing, then only
retired employees already receiving pension payments are
protected because no amounts are due to an employee who has
not already retired.192
Based in part on the reasoning of the Maine Supreme Court
in an earlier case involving pension reform,193 the First Circuit
held that the 1975 statute was not sufficient to create a
contractual obligation in favor of any employee who had not yet
retired, even if the employee was eligible to retire but had not yet
done so.194 In the earlier case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
rejected the notion that pension terms become binding
contractual promises at the moment of employment.195 The First
Circuit reasoned that this indicates that the word due in the 1975
statue does not refer to pension terms in effect at the time of
employment.196 The court, however, recognized that this does not
resolve the question whether pension terms might be due once an
employee has sufficient creditable service, and is old enough, to
retire.197 For the First Circuit, in light of the Maine court’s
189. See Parker, 123 F.3d at 2 (recapitulating the district court’s holding).
190. See id. at 8–9.
191. See id. at 8.
192. See id.
193. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993).
194. See Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (“We need not
decide whether the statute ever gives rise to a contractual relationship; it is
enough to say that it does not clearly do so before a teacher retires, and thus
gains an immediate right to the payment of pension benefits.”).
195. See Spiller, 627 A.2d at 516.
196. See Parker, 123 F.3d at 8–9 (1st Cir. 1997) (reasoning that the word due
does not imply a contractual relationship at the time of employment).
197. See id. at 8 (noting that neither party argued whether contractual
obligations arise respecting pension terms upon an employee receiving sufficient
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understanding of the word due, the unmistakability doctrine
tipped the scales against finding a contractual obligation to
employees who were eligible to retire.198 Thus, all of the 1993
pension reforms could be applied to all nonretired Maine
employees without violating the Contract Clause. This is a
relatively narrow understanding of the Contract Clause’s
protection of government pension promises.
A finding that a contractual right in pension benefits exists
does not mean that pension reform measures are automatically
unconstitutional. As mentioned above, the Contract Clause
prohibits only substantial impairments,199 and, as discussed
below, allows substantial impairments if they are “reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”200 There is
no clear line in the case law between substantial and
insubstantial impairments.201 The central inquiry appears to be
whether the complaining party actually relied on the altered term
or terms. As one court put it:
In determining whether an impairment is substantial and so
not “permitted under the Constitution,” of greatest concern
appears to be the contracting parties’ actual reliance on the
abridged contractual term. Specifically, the Supreme Court
has examined contracts to determine whether the abridged
right is one that was “reasonably relied” on by the complaining

creditable service hours).
198. If, in a subsequent case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court holds that
the 1975 statute prohibits pension plan changes that alter the benefits that
would be paid to employees already eligible to retire, the First Circuit’s
conclusion would be subject to revision. However, a case subsequent to such a
determination by the Maine court is unlikely to arise in federal court because
the state courts would have already prohibited the changes to the pension plan
that might violate the Contract Clause.
199. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (indicating
the importance of the substantiality requirement).
200. Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S. Trust Co.
of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)); see also Energy Reserves Grp., Inc.
v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983) (noting that to overcome
“a substantial impairment, the state, in justification, must have a significant
and legitimate public purpose”).
201. See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012,
1017 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that the “Supreme Court has provided little specific
guidance as to what constitutes a ‘substantial’ contract impairment”).
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party, . . . or one that “substantially induced” that party “to
enter into the contract.”202

For example, in a case involving an alleged impairment of
municipal bonds issued by a water utility, the bondholders
complained that their Contract Clause rights were violated when
the water utility was no longer legally entitled to place a lien on
property based on a default by a tenant.203 When the bonds were
issued, default by a tenant allowed the utility to place a lien on
the land even if the owner had not contracted for service.204 This
increased the likelihood of payment after default. The court
concluded that a loss of the ability to place a lien on the landlord’s
property after default by a tenant was not a substantial
impairment of the contract:
The
bond
contracts
themselves
contain
express
acknowledgements that the parties’ rights were subject to
legislative regulation; there was a long established precedent
of extensive state regulation of public utilities; the contracts
were not abolished but merely modified; and the abridged
right is, by its nature, not one central to the parties’
undertaking.205

Another factor that is relevant to whether there is a
substantial impairment of a contract under the Contract Clause
is whether the law has provided alternative benefits to the party
whose rights have allegedly been impaired. As discussed above,
this is also an important factor in some states for satisfying state
law restrictions on pension modification. Rather than isolate the
individual elements in the contractual agreement, courts
holistically ask whether the parties’ overall situation has been
made significantly worse. For example, in the case involving the
bondholders discussed above, in the year before the bondholders
lost the right to place liens on landlords’ property, they gained
the right, under state law, to terminate water service for
nonpayment.206 The court held that the addition of this very
202. City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 57 F.3d 385, 392
(4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
246 (1978); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514 (1965)).
203. See id. at 388.
204. Id. at 387.
205. Id. at 394.
206. See id. at 394–95.
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effective remedy for nonpayment meant that overall there was
not a substantial impairment of the bondholders’ contractual
rights.207 In the pension reform area, this flexibility can be
important as governments struggle to reduce their costs without
harming employees who depend on the benefits.
Amy Monahan concludes from her examination of the case
law that, in general, changes to the level of benefits and changes
that affect the rights and responsibilities of employers are held to
be substantial impairments.208 In her view, except perhaps in
extraordinary circumstances, changing the method for calculating
benefits so that lower benefits are paid is likely to be found to be
a substantial impairment of the contract.209 Monahan points out,
however, that some states, such as California, allow substantial
pension reform as “reasonable and necessary” impairments before
retirement because, in their understanding of state law,
employees have a right to a “substantial or reasonable pension”
but not to a specific level of benefits.210
Despite this recognition that California courts have allowed
substantial pension reform as reasonable and necessary,
Monahan is highly critical of California’s general approach to
pension reform, an approach that she recognizes has been
followed by at least a dozen more states.211 Monahan states that
the California rule recognizing contractual rights in pension
promises from the first day of employment is, for several reasons,
“surprising”:
First, it runs contrary to the well-established legal
presumption that statutes do not create contractual rights
absent clear and unambiguous evidence that the legislature
intended to bind itself. Second, courts interpreting the
California Rule have held that the contract protects . . . the
rate of future accrual. This interpretation is contrary to
federal Contract Clause jurisprudence, which holds that
prospective changes to a contract should not be considered
207. See id. (reasoning that, because the new remedy to terminate water
service more effectively served the aims of bondholders than the previous
remedy, no substantial impairment of contractual rights occurred).
208. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform, supra note 118, at 629–31.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 628 (citing Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 582 P.2d 614 (Cal. 1978)).
211. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts, supra note 119, at 1032.
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unconstitutional impairments. Third, not only is this
interpretation contrary to general contract theory, it also
appears to create economic inefficiency, in that it fixes in place
one part of an employee’s compensation. . . . California courts
have held that even though the state can terminate a worker,
lower her salary, or reduce her other benefits, the state cannot
decrease the worker’s rate of pension accrual as long as she is
employed. This framework can be welfare reducing. Given the
option, an employee may prefer to accept lower future pension
accruals in return for avoiding termination or a reduction in
current compensation, but such deals are hard to accomplish
in a system that protects the right to future accruals. It should
also be noted that the protections the California Rule appears
to offer are illusory, given that it simply forces a state that
needs to reduce costs to do so in some area other than pension
accruals—for example, through layoffs or salary reductions.
Viewed holistically, the California Rule simply does not protect
employees’ economic interests, and in some cases the rule may
even harm the interests of the very employees it is meant to
protect.212

Monahan may be correct that California law is contrary to
general legal principles and more protective of employees than
federal Contract Clause jurisprudence, but I do not find
California law “surprising.” On her first point, there are good
reasons to treat statutory promises to government employees
different from promises contained in other regulatory statutes.
Most people have multiple employment options at the outset and
at various stages of their careers. Retirement promises form part
of the inducement for individuals to choose and remain in
government employment. While businesses may be in a similar
situation and may suffer, as did the Charles River Bridge
Company, when the regulatory rug is pulled out from under
them, individuals have much less ability to diversify regulatory
risk than businesses. Employees cannot be expected to save two
or three times for retirement or change jobs every so often so
their retirement promises come from multiple employers. This
recognition helps explain why federal law protects private
pensions through the ERISA and the programs administered by
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. That the federal
Contracts Clause may be less protective than state law is no
212.

Id. at 1032–33.
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reason for state law to change. Under familiar understandings of
federalism, in many situations, federal law should be lenient with
regard to state law, especially when the state’s own operations
are involved, stepping in only in extreme cases.
As to Monahan’s claim that protecting pension promises is
inefficient because the optimal result may be reduced pension
promises rather than layoffs that might be necessary to fund
remaining employees’ pensions, this is a dilemma that is familiar
to anyone studying labor economics. As wages and benefits
increase, employers may hire fewer employees, may fire existing
employees, and may replace employees with technology or
workers in jurisdictions with lower salaries. Some unions have
dealt with this problem by agreeing to lower wages and benefits
for new employees while protecting the wages and benefits of
incumbents. More fundamentally, although Monahan clearly
understands that pension promises are a form of deferred
compensation, her argument in favor of greater flexibility
virtually ignores the ex ante perspective of the parties. At the
time the contract was made, had the employees known that their
pension promises were subject to significant revision, they may
not have accepted government employment or they may have
demanded significantly higher current compensation. Normally,
the security of contract enforcement is thought to increase
efficiency, and Monahan does not refute that general tendency.
Monahan’s strongest point is that protecting future accrual
levels significantly reduces pension flexibility. If she is correct
that public employees are “generally at-will employees, with no
guaranteed period of employment,”213 then it would make legal
and practical sense to allow prospective changes to the terms of a
contract that both parties could simply terminate at any time. Atwill employees’ reliance on future benefits may be viewed as
unworthy of protection. However, there are reasons to doubt her
premise. Government employees are highly unionized214 and are
much more likely than private employees to have job security in
the form of contractual or civil service protections. Further,
213. Id. at 1077.
214. See Chris D. Edwards, Public Sector-Unions, TAX & BUDGET BULL. NO.
61 (Cato Institute, D.C.), March 2010 (“In 2009, 39 percent of state and local
workers were members of unions, which was more than five times the share in
the private sector of 7 percent.”).
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advocates of prospective change should recognize that, for
example, a twenty-year government employee suddenly faced
with significantly lower future accrual of retirement benefits may
be seriously damaged economically by the change and may not be
in a position to seek alternate employment or take some other
action to ameliorate the effects of the change.215
Sometimes, pension reforms are touted as providing benefits
to plan participants even if the predominant effect of reform is to
reduce pension expenditures. At a basic level, current and future
recipients benefit from any reform that brings a fund closer to full
funding because fund enhancement makes pension promises
more secure. There are, however, two problems with generalizing
from this possibility to a principle that any reform that enhances
the assets of a pension fund survives Contract Clause scrutiny.
First, this reasoning would allow serious detriment to some
participants as long as most participants gain. While this might
be appropriate in some contexts, for example if a reform reduces
pension spiking by those at the high end of the benefits scale, it
would not be appropriate to sacrifice lower-end recipients who are
heavily dependent on their benefits.216 The financial health of the
fund should not be shored up on the backs of those who can least
afford it. Second, using the financial health of pension funds as a
justification for reforms that otherwise harm plan participants is
illogical if the pension promises involved are viewed as
contractual obligations in favor of recipients. Recipients gain
nothing if under state law the plan must live up to the promises
made regardless of the financial health of whatever fund has
215. See Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Siege: Does State
Law Facilitate or Block Recent Efforts to Cut the Pension Benefits of Public
Servants?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 179, 194 (2012) (criticizing Monahan’s
conclusions for failing to recognize the reasonable expectations of pension plan
participants).
216. I do not mean to say that payments to those receiving the smallest
pensions should be immune from reduction or other reform, such as reducing
cost of living increases. The real question is economic dependency. Some retirees
receiving small pensions barely worked for the government and just got over the
eligibility bar with questionable creditable service, such as volunteer service on
a local government board or commission. Other retirees receiving small pensions
are highly dependent on those benefits because they worked at relatively low
paying government jobs for long periods and did not participate in federal Social
Security during that time. It is thus difficult to design reforms based purely on
the size of the pension.
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been established to marshal assets to make the payments.
Reform under such circumstances benefits only the state budget,
not pension plan participants.217
The final issue in a Contract Clause controversy examines
the government interest advanced by the challenged reforms.
Although the Contract Clause is phrased as an absolute
prohibition on state laws impairing contracts, as noted, courts
apply what appears to be akin to an intermediate level of
constitutional scrutiny in Contract Clause cases, asking whether
the challenged government acts are “reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose.”218 In the pension area, this
standard may save reforms that are designed to combat abusive
pension practices.219 The question remains, however, whether a
pure desire to save money is sufficient to save a reform measure
that operates only to reduce payments to retirees, increase
contributions from retirees, or both.220

217. I leave to the side for now the possibility of bankruptcy, which might
allow greater reductions. See infra Part V.
218. Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S. Trust Co.
of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)); see also Energy Reserves Grp., Inc.
v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983) (noting that to overcome
“a substantial impairment, the State, in justification, must have a significant
and legitimate public purpose”); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
219. Courts seem open to reforms that curb abusive pension practices. For
example, in Madden v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, 729 N.E.2d 1095
(2000), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court approved a decision by the
Teachers’ Retirement Board to close a loophole that would have allowed a parttime teacher to receive full-time credit for part-time service. Id. at 1100.
However, the court disapproved of application of the new rule to part-time
service before the rule was adopted. Id. at 1099. The Court stated that
modifications in benefits are allowed if they are “reasonable and bear some
material relationship to the theory of a pension system and its successful
operation.” Id. at 1098.
220. For an argument that budget difficulties and financial downturns
should provide adequate reasons to allow states to modify their pension
obligations, see Whitney Cloud, Comment, State Pension Deficits, the Recession,
and a Modern View of the Contracts Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 2199 (2011). See also
Gavin Reinke, Note, When a Promise Isn’t A Promise: Public Employers’ Ability
to Alter Pension Plans of Retired Employees, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1689–91
(2011) (arguing that saving money is a legitimate government interest
supporting pension reform against substantive due process challenge).
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In general, it appears that courts rarely approve substantial
impairments as supported by a sufficient government interest.221
In support of pension reform, it might simply be argued that
saving money is an important public purpose and thus, especially
if obligations to retirees pose a fiscal crisis as some claim,
reducing pension obligations is “reasonably necessary” to serve
that interest. The problem is that this could be said about
virtually any breach of contract by government—the government
has decided that it would be better off not living up to its
promises because, at a minimum, it saves resources. As the
Supreme Court stated in a Contract Clause case not involving
public pensions:
Merely because the government actor believes that money can
be better spent or should now be conserved does not provide a
sufficient interest to impair the obligation of contract. If a State
could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to
spend the money for what it regarded as an important public
purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at
all.222

There should therefore be some additional government interest
behind pension reform. Such an interest might be in eliminating
fraud or abusive pension practices that detract from equity
among workers and result in unjustifiable benefits, that is,
benefits with no relation to the retirement income that the
employee was relying on as part of government service.
It is unclear whether the government interest in saving
money on pension expenses would be more acceptable if it were
linked to a history of overly generous promises and abusive
practices. The government should be viewed as having an interest
in closing loopholes that allow abusive practices. In general,
government has an interest in protecting the integrity and
fairness of programs it administers.223 Courts should be more
221. See Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform, supra note 118, at 631
(“The only public pension plan cases identified that found substantial
impairments to be reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose were cases in which the court first held that no substantial impairment
occurred.”).
222. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Borjesson, 92 F.3d 954, 955–56 (9th Cir.
1996) (recognizing as important the government’s interest in maintaining
integrity and the appearance of integrity in government programs); Donovan v.
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receptive to reforms that target practices that are regarded as
abusive than to reforms that reduce benefits to employees who
legitimately relied on them.
The propriety of considering the government’s interest in
saving money as the interest behind pension reform is also linked
to the structure of the pension plan and state law on whether
pension promises are strictly enforceable. If plan participants are
legally entitled under state law to their promised payments
regardless of whether the state has set aside sufficient funds to
meet its obligations, it would seem that the simple interest in
saving money should not be sufficient to support pension reform.
Under such circumstances, to allow government’s interest in
saving money to support reducing benefits would essentially
nullify the plan participants’ legal rights without any
compensatory benefit.
B. The Takings Clause and Pension Reform
Another possible constitutional constraint on pension reform
is the Takings Clause, which prohibits government from taking
property for public use without compensation.224 In litigation
involving public pensions, it is common for claims under the
Contract Clause and Takings Clause to be made together over the
same reform because under current understandings government
contractual promises may be considered property for
constitutional purposes.225 With regard to state and local reforms,
the Takings Clause is unlikely to add much to claims under the
Contract Clause because a participant’s interest in pension
promises is unlikely to be property unless it is found to be a
contractual promise protected under the Contract Clause or state
Fitzsimmons, 778 F.2d 298, 319 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[A]side from protecting the
individual beneficiaries of these pension programs, the government in this case
clearly has a separate and unique interest in protecting the very integrity, heart
and lifeline of the program itself.”).
224. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”).
225. See, e.g., San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Emps.’ Ret.
Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 736–41 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing plaintiffs’ allegation that
failure to fund a pension plan adequately violated both the Contracts Clause
and Takings Clause).

64

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2013)

law pension doctrine.226 It is theoretically possible, however, that
a reform that does not violate the Contract Clause, because the
government’s action is reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose, violates the Takings Clause. This is
because the government’s justification for a taking is irrelevant—
if it takes property even for the most important of purposes, it
must pay compensation.
The takings claim is strongest with regard to benefits that
have already been paid, and might also be relatively strong with
regard to reforms that reduce pension payments to people already
receiving them. In National Education Ass’n-Rhode Island ex. rel.
Scigulinsky v. Retirement Board of the Rhode Island Employees’
Retirement System,227 involving “evictions” of participants from a
state pension plan, the First Circuit upheld legislation that
halted public pension payments to private union employees.228
The legislation required the state to repay, with interest, these
participants’ contributions to the system insofar as they exceeded
what the participants had received in payments.229 The court
noted that “[p]ension payments actually made to retirees become
their property and are protected against takings, even if and
where the payments are unquestionably a gift.”230 The law is less
clear with regard to promises made to people who have already
retired. Some courts view such benefits as vested and immune
from reduction.231 Other courts view such benefits as regulatory
226. See, e.g., Picard v. Members of Emp. Ret. Bd. of Providence, 275 F.3d
139, 144 (1st Cir. 2001) (“In evaluating whether a purported contract or
property right is entitled to constitutional protection under the Takings Clause,
Contract Clause, or Due Process Clause, this Court generally looks to state law
as interpreted by the state’s highest court.”); Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex rel.
Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1999)
(“It would make nonsense of such rulings—and the clear intent requirement—to
conclude that an expectancy insufficient to constitute an enforceable contract
against the state could simply be renamed ‘property’ and enforced as a promise
through the back door under the Takings Clause.”).
227. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex. rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emps.’
Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 1999).
228. See id. at 31 (finding constitutional the Rhode Island Eviction Act,
which eliminated retirement benefits to employees of teachers’ unions).
229. See id. at 24–25 (describing the Rhode Island Eviction Act at issue).
230. Id. at 30.
231. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 292 (N.M. 1999) (finding that
retirement plans create a property right in the amount of benefits promised
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promises that are open to change, assuming state law does not
clearly immunize them from revision.232 The same can be said of
benefit promises to people eligible to retire at the time reforms
are enacted. Some courts treat these as vested and immutable,
but again, this depends largely on the terms of state law.233
Because of this connection to state law, the Takings Clause is
likely to follow the Contract Clause in recognizing only those
claims that involve unmistakable contractual promises already
protected from reduction under state law.
The possibility that a pension reform measure that satisfies
Contract Clause scrutiny but nevertheless might require
compensation under the Takings Clause implicates the thorny
issue of the extent to which regulation under the state’s police
power that reduces the value of property can constitute a taking
of that property requiring compensation. If each dollar of
promised pension benefits is viewed as a separate property
interest, then it would seem that any diminution would violate
the Takings Clause. But if instead the property interest is viewed
as the value of the pension as a whole, then reforms that preserve
the bulk of expected benefits should not be problematic. In this
Article, I will not attempt to resolve the conceptual difficulties
that plague regulatory takings doctrine.234 It should be noted,
however, that the application of regulatory takings analysis is
upon vesting and requiring compensation for their reduction); see also Reinke,
supra note 220, at 1694 (discussing the approaches of different courts with
respect to promised future benefits).
232. See Reinke, supra note 220, at 1693 (discussing the approaches of
different courts with respect to promised future benefits).
233. See id. at 1694 (examining the impact of reform laws on retirees).
234. Regulatory takings doctrine has proven very lenient in terms of
allowing changes in government regulation to cause substantial reductions in
the value of private property without requiring compensation. See, e.g., Adrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (“When we review regulation, a reduction in the
value of property is not necessarily a taking.”). However, the law is very strict
when government requires the actual physical occupation of private property.
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (holding that “a permanent physical occupation authorized by
government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may
serve”). It is difficult to fit reduction in pension benefits into this paradigm. On
the one hand, if each dollar of expected benefits is considered a separate piece of
property, then taking one away might be considered a taking. On the other
hand, if the property interest is in a reasonable pension in light of work
performed, then reforms may not appear to be prohibited takings.
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highly uncertain in the public pension context because the
property rights at issue are contractual and perhaps even
regulatory, which makes it difficult to separate the terms of state
law from the value of the property allegedly taken.235
The reasons for the relative leniency of regulatory takings
law apply in the context of pension reform. Regulatory takings
law recognizes that adapting government policy to changed
circumstances or new priorities would be impossible if every
regulatory diminution in the value of a property interest requires
compensation. Flexibility is even more important if it appears
that pension promises are overly generous, subject to abuse by
legislators and other officials handing out political favors, and by
employees using loopholes and tricks to spike their pensions. It is
one thing for the government to breach a simple arm’s-length
contract with a supplier of goods or services. It is quite another
for government to attempt to rein in excessive pension promises
made to secure the power of incumbent politicians at the expense
of taxpayers. Just as the law does not generally recognize a
reliance interest in a static regulatory environment, so too is it
unlikely to recognize a reliance interest in a completely static
public pension system.236 To the extent that courts apply the
Takings Clause to pension reform, they are unlikely to rule
against reforms except in the most extreme circumstances.237
As noted, takings analysis is likely to mirror the analysis
undertaken pursuant to state law pension protections and the
Contract Clause. The Takings Clause may have independent bite
in one potentially significant situation—when pension reform is
undertaken pursuant to federal law, either because changes are
235. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the property rights in public pensions
as contractual).
236. See, e.g., Concrete Pipes & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 641–49 (1993) (stating that imposition of
withdrawal liability for exiting multi-employer pension is not a taking requiring
compensation under the Takings Clause); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 221–25 (1986) (upholding statute imposing liability for
withdrawal from private multi-employer pension plan against Takings Clause
challenge).
237. See, e.g., Concrete Pipes, 508 U.S. at 602 (applying the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the pension system); Connolly, 472 U.S. at 221
(considering whether employer withdrawal liability for public pensions is a
compensable taking under the Takings Clause).
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being made to federal government pensions or because state
pensions are adjusted pursuant to federal law, most notably
federal bankruptcy law. The Contract Clause does not apply to
the federal government and therefore federal changes to existing
contractual relationships are scrutinized under the more lenient
minimal scrutiny applied to substantive due process challenges to
economic regulation.238 If federal law allows or even requires the
reduction of pension benefits to federal or state and local
employees, the Takings Clause might be the most promising
avenue for attacking the reform. In the current context, a key
issue is whether a municipality can use federal bankruptcy law to
discharge its pension obligations. As discussed below, the answer
appears to be yes, and, because the Contract Clause does not
apply to the federal government, the principal legal question
becomes whether a discharge pursuant to bankruptcy law could
be viewed as an uncompensated taking. This is discussed
below.239
V. Bankruptcy, Reduction of Pension Obligations, and Default240
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code241
“adjustment of debts of a municipality.”242
government units can declare bankruptcy and
adjusted under federal law.243 Municipalities

allows for the
In short, local
have their debts
may not employ

238. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730
(1984) (“The retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects,
must meet the test of due process[.] [T]hat burden is met simply by showing
that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational
legislative purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
239. See infra Part V (concluding that takings principles are unlikely to
prevent state and local governments from pursuing pension reform through
bankruptcy or otherwise).
240. I am indebted to Ted Orson, lawyer for the city of Central Falls, Rhode
Island, and the state of Rhode Island in the city’s municipal bankruptcy
proceedings for guiding me through Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and
offering his perspective on the subject. For a theoretical overview of municipal
bankruptcy, see generally Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When
Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI.
L. REV. 425 (1993).
241. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2006).
242. Id. § 901.
243. See id. (allowing a municipality to declare bankruptcy and develop a
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federal bankruptcy law if the law of their state does not allow
it.244 In other words, local governments need state permission to
declare bankruptcy. In theory, in states in which municipal
bankruptcy is allowed, federal bankruptcy law could be employed
by municipal governments to reduce or eliminate their pension
obligations.245
There are significant differences between municipal
bankruptcy and bankruptcy of private entities. Most
significantly, there is no provision for liquidation of municipal
assets and termination of the existence of the municipality.246 It
is thought that federal liquidation of a municipal government
would be too great an intrusion into state authority.247 Further,
bankruptcy may not be used to restructure the municipal
government because that too would interfere with state authority
over municipalities.248 Finally, there is no provision in federal law
for states themselves to declare bankruptcy, and any such effort
would be met with serious constitutional objections.
There are five statutory conditions249 that must be met for
municipalities to use Chapter 9 to adjust their finances. First, the
municipality must be authorized under state law to be a debtor
under Chapter 9.250 Second, the debtor must actually be a

reorganization plan to adjust its debts).
244. See id. § 109(c)(2) (specifying an entity may be a debtor under Chapter
9 only if specifically authorized by state law).
245. The funded portion of future pension benefits might not be subject to
adjustment in bankruptcy, but unfunded obligations might be subject to
“discharge at less than full payment.” Skeel, supra note 83, at 692.
246. See id. (explaining the lack of liquidation provisions in Chapter 9).
247. See id. (“Such a liquidation or dissolution would undoubtedly violate
the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution and the reservation to the states of
sovereignty over their internal affairs.”).
248. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 903–904 (2006) (specifying Chapter 9 does not limit
the power of the state to control a municipality and explaining the limited
powers of any court).
249. See id. § 109(c) (listing the requirements for a municipality to enter
Chapter 9 bankruptcy).
250. Id. § 109(b). The Allegheny Institute reports that as of 2010, nineteen
states authorized their municipalities to employ federal bankruptcy. Allegheny
Institute, Issue Summary: Municipal Bankruptcy (Jan. 2011), http://www.
alleghenyinstitute.org/government/munbankruptcy.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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municipality.251 For villages, cities, towns, counties, and such,
this is normally not a difficult condition to meet, but status as a
municipality may be less clear for other government entities,
such as water districts, school districts, and other special purpose
agencies. Third, the debtor must be insolvent.252 “Insolvent” is
defined in the Bankruptcy Code to mean either failing to pay
debts or “unable to pay its debts as they become due.”253 In the
case law, this is interpreted to mean not only that the
municipality is running a deficit but also that it will be unable to
pay its debts in the current or next fiscal year.254 Fourth, the
municipality must desire to make a plan to reorganize its
debts.255 This precludes involuntary municipal bankruptcy. Fifth,
the municipality must do one of the following: obtain agreement
from creditors holding a majority of claims, negotiate in good
faith with creditors, show that negotiation would be
impracticable, or reasonably believe that a creditor will obtain a
preference absent bankruptcy.256 Usually, this fifth requirement
results in negotiations with creditors before the municipality
files.257
Municipal bankruptcy allows for adjustment of pension
liabilities to both retired workers and current workers,258 at least
251. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1).
252. Id. § 109(c)(3).
253. Id. § 101(32).
254. See In re City of Bridgeport, 132 B.R. 85, 88–89 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991)
(requiring the city to show it was unable to pay bills as they came due).
Apparently, a high percentage of municipal filings are rejected, as the city of
Bridgeport’s was, because the municipality is not legally insolvent. See
McConnell & Picker, supra note 240, at 457–60 (describing the gatekeeper effect
of the insolvency requirement).
255. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2006).
256. Id. § 109(c)(5).
257. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 240, at 460–61 (explaining that
most debtors negotiate prepetition).
258. During the legislative process leading to the adoption of the current
version of Chapter 9, there were concerns expressed over the effects of
municipal bankruptcy on pensions. It is not clear that legislators understood the
extent to which municipal pensions would be subject to adjustment in
bankruptcy. On the floor of the Senate, New York Senator Jacob Javits
expressed the view that in light of the New York constitution’s provision
protecting pension rights, due process would prevent pensions already being
received from being subject to adjustment in bankruptcy. 122 CONG. REC. 4377
(1976) (remarks of Senator Javits). In response to Senator Javits’s request for
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with regard to assets that are not held by an entity separate and
apart from the insolvent municipality.259 For current workers,
their labor contracts are considered executory contracts under
§ 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, which is explicitly applicable to
municipal bankruptcy.260 Debtors are authorized by § 365 to
reject their executory contracts.261 Thus, in the bankruptcy of
Central Falls, Rhode Island, on the day the petition was filed, the
confirmation of his understanding, North Dakota Senator Quentin Burdick
stated that with regard to those whose pension rights had vested,“[u]nder New
York law it would be, at the very least, a paramount claim on any assets of the
bankruptcy.” Id. (remarks of Senator Burdick). It is unclear what Senator
Burdick meant by a “paramount claim” since there is no provision in the
Bankruptcy Code establishing priority for pension claims. In the House of
Representatives, New York Representative Elizabeth Holtzman was concerned
that rejection of collective bargaining agreements might leave retirees in the
position of unsecured creditors. Id. at 2422 (remarks of Representative
Holtzman). New York Representative Herman Badillo raised the concern that
pension funds administered by boards of trustees that included municipal
officials might be considered arms of the municipality making their assets
subject to adjustment in bankruptcy. Representative Badillo stated for the
record that his understanding of the intent of Congress was that such trustees
are not acting as municipal officials and thus municipalities do not have any
claim on the assets of such separately administered pension funds, which would
place them beyond the reach of the bankruptcy court. See 122 CONG. REC. 2382
(1976) (remarks of Representative Badillo). This discussion appears to be based
on an understanding that if pension funds have been placed into a trust fund
separate and apart from the bankrupt municipal government, these funds would
not be subject to adjustment in bankruptcy. Future municipal payments to such
funds might, however, be adjusted.
259. When pension assets have been placed into a trust administered for the
benefit of employees, it seems that municipal bankruptcy could not affect those
assets. Retirement benefits could still be affected, however, if trust assets are
inadequate to continue the level of payments. Bankruptcy would presumably
allow the municipality to refuse to make future payments, which would leave
the trust unable to maintain the level of pension benefits promised. This would
make it necessary for the trust to reduce retirees’ pension payments. For
current workers, a similar result is likely. Municipal bankruptcy may not affect
employees’ claims to a share of assets already in trust, but bankruptcy would
allow the municipality to reduce future payments to the trust, thus reducing the
employees’ ultimate pension benefits on retirement.
260. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 365 into Chapter 9). For
the authoritative definition of “executory contract” in bankruptcy, see Vern
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439,
460 (1973).
261. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006) (“[T]he trustee, subject to the court’s
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor.”).

THE PUBLIC PENSION CRISIS

71

city rejected all of its collective bargaining agreements and
imposed new terms of employment, including new provisions
relating to pensions.262 Due to the special nature of collective
bargaining agreements, rejection of municipal collective
bargaining agreements is allowed only if the balance of equities
favors rejection.263 If this standard is met, municipalities can
262. Unless otherwise noted, all information concerning the Central Falls,
Rhode Island bankruptcy is drawn from a conversation with Ted Orson,
bankruptcy attorney for the city of Central Falls and the state of Rhode Island
and from the Chapter 9 plan for the city filed with the Bankruptcy Court.
Interview with Ted Orson, Bankruptcy Attorney, City of Central Falls and State
of Rhode Island, in Bos., Mass. (July 26, 2012) [hereinafter Orson Interview]; see
also Fourth Amended Bankruptcy Plan, In re City of Central Falls, Rhode
Island, 468 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2012) (No. 11-13105) [hereinafter Central
Falls Bankruptcy Plan], available at http://www.rib.uscourts.gov/newhome/
central_falls/CF479.asp.
263. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527–34 (1984). It should be
noted that after the Supreme Court decided that it was not an unfair labor
practice for a debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement in Bildisco,
Congress enacted special provisions regarding rejection of collective bargaining
agreements. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
§ 541, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006));
Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527–34. Those provisions are not among those listed by
Congress as applying to municipal bankruptcy, which means that rejection of
municipal collective bargaining agreements is governed by Bildisco’s balance of
equities standard, which the Supreme Court determined was the most accurate
reading of Congress’s intent regarding the application of § 365 to collective
bargaining agreements. See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 521–26 (determining that
Congress’s intent was likely that the municipality may reject agreements only if
the equities balance in favor of rejection); see also Note, Executory Labor
Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 957, 965 (1976) (suggesting
that the balance of equities in municipal bankruptcy is likely to point in favor of
rejection to preserve the municipality’s ability to provide essential services).
Another difference between rejection under § 365 and rejection under § 1113 is
that when a contract is rejected under § 365, the creditor has a claim for
damages as an unsecured creditor for breach of contract. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)
(2006) (“[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor
constitutes a breach of such contract or lease.”). By contrast, the dominant view
is that when rejection is accomplished under § 1113, the affected employees
have no claim for damages because their rights have already been determined
under federal bankruptcy law. See, e.g., In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 147 B.R.
720, 732 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code, as presently
enacted, does not provide or recognize a remedy for damages resulting from
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under § 1113.”); see also Executory
Labor Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy, supra, 85 YALE L.J. at 968–73
(discussing renegotiation of rejected collective bargaining agreements and not
suggesting that unionized employees would have a claim for damages after
rejection). For a discussion of the constitutionality of state and local rejection of
collective bargaining agreements, see generally Ronald D. Wenkart, Unilateral
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reduce or eliminate pension and health care promises to current
workers, and require them to contribute more toward the costs of
both.
With regard to retired municipal workers already receiving
pension benefits, the situation is simpler as a legal matter but
more complicated as an equitable or political matter. Because
retired employees have no substantial remaining contractual
obligations to the municipality, their pension promises are no
longer considered executory contracts.264 Rather, under
bankruptcy law, the obligation to make future pension and health
care265 payments to retired workers is a simple debt of the debtor,
and the creditors (retired workers) have only unsecured claims
against the municipality.266 The claims are unsecured because
workers do not have separate individual accounts into which
their retirement contributions (and the employer’s matching
contributions) have been deposited. In fact, for municipalities
Modification of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Times of Fiscal Crisis and
Bankruptcy: An Unconstitutional Impairment of Contract?, 225 ED. L. REP. 1
(2007).
264. See Countryman, supra note 260, at 460 (defining executory contract);
see also Hannah Heck, Comment, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The
Limitations of the Current Bankruptcy Option, 8 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89, 124
(2011) (concluding that pension obligations to retired workers are not executory
contracts because retirees have no continuing contractual obligations). This
comment also argues that any state law impediments to implementation of
federal bankruptcy law in the public pension context (other than state refusal to
allow its municipalities to use Chapter 9) would be preempted by federal law.
Id. at 120–21.
265. For example, after the City of Stockton, California, filed a Chapter 9
case in June 2012, the city council adopted a budget that reduced retiree health
care benefits. In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 14 (E.D. Cal. 2012). The
bankruptcy court denied the retirees’ request for an injunction to restore their
benefits to prebankruptcy levels, mainly on the ground that the court had
neither the power nor the jurisdiction to grant such an injunction. See id. at 30
(finding that 11 U.S.C. § 904 forbids the bankruptcy court from issuing the
requested injunction). The bankruptcy court in the Stockton case also observed
that the Contract Clause is no impediment to adjustment of municipal contracts
pursuant to bankruptcy because the Contract Clause does not apply to federal
law. Id. at 15.
266. See Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9:
Can Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 365 (2011), 401–02 (“[A] Chapter 9 debtor’s postpetition
obligations to its retirees arising out of prepetition contractual (or impliedly
contractual) relationships arguably are entitled to nothing more than general
unsecured nonpriority status and may be impaired in a plan of adjustment.”).
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with severe underfunding, benefits may be paid out of the
contributions of current employees, and there is no segregation of
the funds contributed by each worker and by the municipality
itself on behalf of each worker.267
This means that theoretically, retired workers could see their
benefits subjected to severe reduction. Given that many
municipal workers have not participated in the federal Social
Security system,268 this could cause serious hardship, basically
placing retirees without other savings into abject poverty. There
have been so few municipal bankruptcies and even fewer in
which pensions to current retirees are adjusted that there is no
real precedent for how retirees ought to be treated. The proposed
plan in the Central Falls, Rhode Island bankruptcy, which cited
pension and health care obligations to retirees as a major cause of
insolvency,269 would reduce most retirees’ pension benefits by
55%, except that no retiree’s pension would be reduced below
$10,000 per year.270 While these cuts may seem draconian, the
plan treated retirees better than other unsecured creditors.
Apparently, there was a strong feeling among those involved in
the bankruptcy that it would have been inhumane to reduce
retirees’ benefits to the level they would get as unsecured
creditors.271
To some, it may still seem cruel to reduce pensions so much.
Many of Central Falls’s employees worked for the city for
decades, always expecting that their pensions would be paid
based on the formula established in their employment
contracts.272 They may have relied on those funds in making
important life choices such as whether to continue their city
267. See Heck, supra note 264, at 96 (“[A]dditional difficulties result when
local governments attempt to make up the shortfalls in pension revenues by
drawing down pension reserves or funds from pension trusts and from funding
pension obligations by continuing current employee contributions.”).
268. See BIGGS, supra note 23, at 2–3 (explaining that municipal retirement
plans are often a substitute or supplement for the Social Security system).
269. See Mary Williams Walsh & Katie Zezima, Small City, Big Debt
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, at B1 (explaining that Central Falls’s
financial troubles were largely due to its pensions and health care systems).
270. See Central Falls Bankruptcy Plan, supra note 262 (describing the
provisions of the city’s reduction in retiree pension benefits).
271. Orson Interview, supra note 262.
272. Id.
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employment, whether to save or spend their salaries, whether to
move, and whether to go back to school to train for a different
profession. As discussed above, most pensions are not
unreasonable when viewed in light of the employees’ total
compensation packages.273 A worker retiring at a $50,000 salary
may see a $35,000 pension reduced to under $16,000, and may
have increased health care costs. This is a serious hardship to the
people involved and may be life changing for many of them.
However, this is the pain caused in many situations of insolvency.
Just as Bernard Madoff’s clients were led to believe that their
investments were worth much more than was true, the city of
Central Falls misled its employees. Apparently the city failed for
years to make its actuarially required contributions on behalf of
its employees.274 The money to pay retirees’ pensions in full was
simply not there. The question is whether the city or the state
should be required to increase taxes or employ some other
financial device to make good on these promises.
Given the lack of precedent, it remains to be seen whether
other unsecured creditors will challenge favorable treatment to
retirees in municipal bankruptcy as unfair to them, perhaps
arguing that they will receive lower payouts on their claims as a
result of the favorable treatment of pension claims. It also
remains to be seen how federal bankruptcy courts will react to
such claims. Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to deal
with the problem, but federalism concerns counsel against it.275
Congress may not want to interfere with the local political
considerations that are likely to affect the treatment of retirees in
municipal bankruptcy. Some states have enacted legislation
allowing state authorities to assume supervision over distressed
municipalities.276 More specifically, in Central Falls, the retirees
273. See supra Part II.B (describing pension benefits in the context of total
compensation).
274. Orson Interview, supra note 262.
275. See Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1063, 1068–76 (2002) (describing the federalism concerns implicated by federal
bankruptcy law).
276. See, e.g., 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 320/4 (2010) (allowing a local government
to petition the state for assistance in cases of financial distress); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 141.1515 (2011) (allowing the Governor to make a determination of
financial distress and declare a local government in receivership); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 159-3 (2010) (creating the Local Government Commission to take control
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negotiated for a five-year transition period during which their
pension benefits would be reduced by only 25%.277 This was
contingent on the state legislature providing funding during the
transition period, which it did.278 Federal standards on the
treatment of government retirees in bankruptcy might interfere
with these local political efforts.
The Contract Clause of the federal Constitution is no bar to
municipal bankruptcy for the simple reason that the Contract
Clause does not apply to the federal government.279 While the
first municipal bankruptcy law was found to violate the Contract
Clause by allowing municipalities to violate their contracts,280
this does not appear to be the current understanding. Later, the
constitutionality
of
federal
bankruptcy
for
municipal
governments was upheld against challenges based on federal
interference with state sovereignty and due process,281 and it does
not seem that a challenge based on the contractual or property
rights of municipal creditors would succeed either. Instead of
relatively stringent Contract Clause scrutiny, federal interference
with the obligation of contracts is judged under the deferential
rational basis standard applied to economic regulation
generally.282
of a municipality’s finances if necessary).
277. Orson Interview, supra note 262.
278. Id.
279. Federal laws affecting the obligation of contracts are evaluated under a
less exacting due process standard. For discussion on this point, see Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984) (“To the extent
that recent decisions of the Court have addressed the issue, we have contrasted
the limitations imposed on States by the Contract Clause with the less
searching standards imposed on economic legislation by the Due Process
Clauses.”).
280. See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513,
531 (1936) (striking down the 1934 municipal bankruptcy law as an
unconstitutional interference with state sovereignty). Congress tried again in
1937, and this time the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy was upheld.
See Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653, upheld by
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 50–52 (1938); see also Skeel, supra note
83, at 708 (discussing the Court’s decision in Ashton).
281. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–52 (1938) (upholding the
Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1937).
282. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 728–31 (“Provided that the
retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such
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Even in these difficult financial times, municipal bankruptcy
has been very rare.283 Further, even if municipal bankruptcy
became more common, it would have no effect on the large
portion of unfunded retirement obligations owed by states to their
current and retired workers. As noted, there is no provision for
state governments to file for bankruptcy under federal law.284
There is a question of whether it would be constitutional to
amend federal law to allow states to file for adjustment of their
finances in the same fashion as municipal governments. Professor
Skeel notes that advocates of state bankruptcy do not find the
constitutional objection to be serious if two conditions that
already apply to municipal bankruptcy are met—the filing must
be voluntary, and bankruptcy must not interfere with
governmental decisionmaking.285 He also notes that these
advocates view the constitutional permissibility of municipal
bankruptcy as strong precedent for the constitutionality of state
bankruptcy.286
It is not absolutely clear that the approval of municipal
bankruptcy is precedent for finding no constitutional difficulty
with state bankruptcy. The status of municipal governments
under federal law is inconsistent to say the least. Long ago, in
refusing to intervene in a dispute concerning municipal
boundaries and responsibility for municipal debts, the Supreme
Court stated as a basic principle that municipal governments
exercise state governmental power and are created and organized
purely for the convenience of the states: “Municipal corporations
are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient
legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive
branches.”).
283. See Municipality Bankruptcy, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx (last visited Feb.
2, 2013) (“In the more than 60 years since Congress established a federal
mechanism for the resolution of municipal debts, there have been fewer than
500 municipal bankruptcy petitions filed.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
284. For a discussion of the possibility of authorizing states to employ
bankruptcy to restructure their debts, see generally Skeel, supra note 83.
285. Id. at 679–80.
286. See id. at 680 (“[M]unicipal bankruptcy has long been constitutional if
it satisfies these criteria and gives states the power to forbid their
municipalities from invoking the law.”).
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agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
state as may be entrusted to them.”287 In this light, if
municipalities
are
simply
state
agencies,
then
the
constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy should provide a strong
precedent for the constitutionality of state bankruptcy.
There are, however, many ways in which municipal
governments and state governments are treated differently under
federal law. In the civil rights area, state governments, including
state agencies, are immune from damages by virtue of the
Eleventh Amendment and principles of sovereign immunity,
while municipal governments are not.288 States are not “persons”
subject to federal civil rights liability in state courts while
municipal governments are.289 Given that the Contract Clause is
directed explicitly at states—“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts”290—perhaps state
attempts to reduce their contractually binding pension
obligations should be treated differently than similar actions by
municipal governments.
The fact that municipalities are subject to state control may
provide a basis for treating state and municipal governments
differently with regard to the possibility of using bankruptcy law
to adjust their debts. Unlike other debtors, states theoretically
have the ability to raise whatever funds are necessary to pay
their debts through taxation. Municipal governments may not
have this ability because they are subject to state control.291 The
state legislature could prevent a locality from raising sufficient
funds to pay their debts by forbidding increased taxation or
limiting revenue sources. Further, a geographically small
287. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (explaining
that municipal governments have state governmental power).
288. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635–38 (1980) (finding
no sovereign immunity for municipalities under the Civil Rights Act).
289. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“We hold
that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
‘persons’ under § 1983.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)
(“Our analysis . . . compels the conclusion that Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included among those
persons to whom § 1983 applies.”).
290. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
291. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178 (describing municipal governments as
agents for the convenience of the state).
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municipal government is much more likely to run up against
practical limits on its taxing ability than a large municipality or a
state.
States, by contrast, lack funds only when the states’ own
governments decline to raise them through sufficient taxes and
fees. Lack of taxable wealth may limit the ability of states to raise
revenue, but this is much more likely to be a local problem than a
statewide problem. As a conceptual matter, unless taxation is at
such a high level that there is simply no more wealth to tax, from
the point of view of a creditor, state bankruptcy looks more like a
political decision not to pay debts than a true state of
insolvency.292 However, this picture is somewhat incomplete.
While it is true that state taxpayers in a state with underfunded
pension liabilities are able to push off some of the costs of state
services onto future taxpayers, it is difficult to blame those future
taxpayers for resisting tax increases to pay for pension liabilities
incurred in the past when they may not have been enjoying the
benefits of the services provided in exchange for the unfunded
pension promises. Similarly, it is not difficult to imagine that
future federal taxpayers would resist tax increases to pay the $16
trillion in debt that the federal government has incurred in the
last twelve years or so.
If bankruptcy is not available to states, does that mean that
they are stuck with their pension and health care obligations to
retired workers? Theoretically, the answer seems to be yes, as
perhaps it ought to be given the interests of state retirees and
employees. Default on pension obligations, or alterations beyond
those allowed under Contract Clause jurisprudence, would violate
the federal Constitution and would also be contrary to the law in
many, if not all, states. However, just because state action
violates federal law does not guarantee an effective remedy.

292. Tax increases sufficient to meet all unfunded pension obligations may
be economically disastrous and state taxpayers as a whole would be better off if
states were allowed to reduce their obligations rather than raise taxes. High
taxes can put a damper on economic activity and encourage business to move to
lower tax states or countries. However, state bankruptcy to avoid pension
obligations would exacerbate the unwillingness of state politicians to raise
sufficient funds for pension obligations, which either results in hardship for
workers relying on their pensions or imposes the cost of current labor on future
generations of taxpayers.
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Surprisingly, whether states can be sued in federal court over
alleged constitutional violations in pension reform is unclear.
Controversy over federal remedies for state contractual
violations goes back to the beginnings of the republic.293 When the
state of Georgia defaulted on its bonds after the Revolutionary
War, the Supreme Court ruled in Chisholm v. Georgia294 that
Georgia could be sued in federal court by a nonresident for breach
of contract.295 The state legislature reacted by considering and
nearly passing a statute imposing the death penalty, “without
benefit of clergy,” on anyone attempting to enforce the judgment
in the case.296 The decision also provoked Congress and the states
to pass and ratify the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution,297 which reversed the jurisdictional ruling in the
Chisholm case. One hundred years later, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Eleventh Amendment and principles of sovereign
immunity precluded federal court jurisdiction over a claim
brought by a citizen of Louisiana alleging that the state violated
the U.S. Constitution by defaulting on bonds issued in 1874.298
Thus, it appears that the federal cases establish that states
cannot be sued for damages in federal court without their
consent, even for actions that violate the Constitution of the
United States.299 However, under well-established principles,
293. Johnson & Young, supra note 178, contains an excellent overview of the
history and development of law relating to state default on debt.
294. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
295. Id. at 458.
296. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1058
(1983) (discussing the aftermath of Chisholm).
297. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (providing sovereign immunity to the
states).
298. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1890) (sheltering the state
from suit in federal court on a case arising under the Constitution).
299. See Johnson & Young, supra note 178, at 136 (“The general structure of
American state sovereign immunity law is designed to prevent courts from
compelling payment on debts that threaten the financial viability of the
states.”). It appears to be an open question whether states can avoid their
Takings Clause obligation to pay compensation for takings of private property
by interposing a sovereign immunity defense. A decision by the Supreme Court
recognizing sovereign immunity from takings claims would be shocking. The
Takings Clause appears to be a limit on sovereignty of both the federal
government and state governments now that the Takings Clause applies to
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when state law violates the federal constitution, state officials
can be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief,300 even
if the injunction requires future payments from the state
treasury.301 This means that a state official could be ordered, on
pain of contempt, to make future payments found to be
constitutionally required, but the official could probably not be
ordered to make past payments wrongfully withheld.302 Thus, the
them under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 232–37 (1897) (applying Takings Clause
principles to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause). Perhaps Contract Clause claims against states for breaching their own
contracts should be thought of the same way. This depends, however, on the
expansion of the Contract Clause to cover the state’s own contracts, and state
immunity from contract damages is not directly contrary to clear constitutional
text the way that immunity from takings claims would be (again assuming the
Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
300. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 146–47 (1908) (allowing state
officials to be sued to prevent them from enforcing unconstitutional laws.) The
reach of Young is not completely clear. Other decisions from the same era seem
to validate sovereign immunity in federal court from contract damages and from
suits seeking specific performance of contracts between a state and private
parties. See Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507–08 (1887) (preventing the state
from being sued on a case arising under the Constitution); Hagood v. Southern,
117 U.S. 52, 71 (1886) (refusing to compel states to perform a contract);
Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 748 (1883) (finding a contract
unenforceable against state officials carrying out their duties). Hagood was
distinguished in Young as a case in which the state was the actual party in
interest, which seems to be the case with regard to pension reform as well. See
Young, 209 U.S. at 150 (concluding that Hagood applies when the state is a
party on the record).
301. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289–90 (1977) (requiring the
state to share future costs of educational components following desegregation);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (holding that state may not be
required to make payments for past violations of federal law but noting that
injunctions requiring future payments to comply with federal law are
permissible).
302. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346 (1979) (disallowing a notice that
would have led to a retroactive award in state court requiring the state to make
payment of funds from the treasury). Professor Skeel posits that “the officer
could evade a mandamus action seeking to compel performance of the contract
by simply resigning.” Skeel, supra note 83, at 686. But normally when the case
is brought in the officer’s official capacity, the new occupant of the resigned
official’s office is substituted, and the case continues without regard to the
resignation of the officer. For example, Quern became the defendant in Edelman
v. Jordan when he took Edelman’s position in the state of Illinois. See Quern,
440 U.S. at 333 (noting Quern is the sequel to Edelman). No doubt, state and
local officials may sometimes succeed in avoiding liability, but it is not likely to
be so simple as resigning once the official is ordered to comply with federal law
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conventional understanding seems to be that if state pension
reform is found to violate the federal Constitution, injunctive
relief may be available in federal court to require responsible
officials to make future payments and administer the program
based on preexisting standards, but they could not be ordered to
make up for past reductions in payments or other past
violations.303
This conventional understanding of the line between
permissible and impermissible federal relief against state officials
is more complicated than it seems because it is not entirely clear
that injunctions requiring increases in future payments to meet
constitutional obligations are allowed. Consider, for example, a
recent decision by a federal district court in New Jersey finding
that an attack on pension reforms in New Jersey is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.304 The state of New Jersey passed
legislation increasing employees’ required contributions to state
pension funds and suspending cost of living allowances for both
current and future retirees.305 The plaintiffs challenged these
reforms as impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property
without just compensation, and as violating their due process
rights.306 The court, in a thoughtful opinion, found federal
jurisdiction barred because rather than challenging an ongoing
violation of federal law, the plaintiffs were seeking a remedy for a
past violation, namely the passage of the pension reform statute
at issue.307 Under this reasoning, there is no federal remedy for a
in the future.
303. For an overview of the ways in which judicial decisions constrain state
fiscal decisionmaking, see generally Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, E. Duncan
Getchell, Jr. & Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Judicial Compulsion and the Public
Fisc—A Historical Overview, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 525 (2012).
304. N.J. Educ. Assoc. v. New Jersey, No. 11-5024, 2012 WL 715284, at *1
(D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2012).
305. See id. (describing the changes made under the New Jersey law).
306. Id.
307. The court structured the inquiry as follows:
[T]he question to be answered in this case is appropriately framed as
determining whether Plaintiffs’ requested relief is retroactive or
prospective in nature. Therefore, at the heart of this Court’s Eleventh
Amendment analysis is the following question: was the enactment of
Chapter 78 a single act that has continuing ill-effects or does the
enforcement of Chapter 78 by the Executive Defendants amount to a
continuous violation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights? . . . After
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state’s breach of contract even if the breach violates the Contracts
Clause.308
The final substantive issue to be addressed is whether the
Takings Clause provides protection against diminution of
government pension obligations pursuant to bankruptcy, on the
theory that pensions are property that may not be taken without
just compensation. Takings analysis turns out not to be a
promising avenue of attack for public pension plan participants
seeking to avoid costly reform. In short, although the Supreme
Court has made it clear that takings principles apply to
bankruptcy’s effects on property,309 the Takings Clause is
unlikely to provide protection for public pension recipients and
government employees with accrued service toward pensions
because bankruptcy and other reform does not deprive the
pension plan participants of an interest in identifiable property.
Takings principles limit the ability of bankruptcy to destroy
creditors’ property interests including liens and security interests
that creditors often hold in debtors’ property.310 It does not
examining the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court has determined
that the enactment of Chapter 78 was a single act that continues to
have negative consequences for the Plaintiffs. As such, any redress
sought by the Plaintiffs would be retroactive in nature and is
therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
308. See id. at *5 (“Therefore, the relief requested by Plaintiffs is, in both
substance and practical effect, a request for specific performance of the alleged
pre-Chapter 78 contract existing between Plaintiffs and the State of New
Jersey. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, such relief is not
permitted.” (citing Va. Office of Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632,
1639 (2011))). This conclusion may be consistent with Johnson & Young’s
analysis, assuming that a suit seeking an injunction to force payment of
promised pension obligations is viewed as a suit to compel payment of “the
original debt or obligation.” See Johnson & Young, supra note 178, at 136
(concluding that American state sovereign immunity law is designed to prevent
states from being forced to pay debts that threaten the state’s financial
viability).
309. See United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982) (“The
bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against
taking private property without compensation.”). On the relationship between
bankruptcy and takings principles, see James S. Rogers, The Impairment of
Secured Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship
Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973
(1983).
310. See Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 78 (construing Bankruptcy Code not
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protect purely contractual rights such as the details of pension
promises made by governmental units to past and current
employees. The whole point of bankruptcy is to adjust such
unsecured obligations among the creditors so that no creditor or
class of creditor gains an unfair share of the debtor’s assets.311
The analysis might be different if employees’ and retirees’ funds
were held in segregated accounts for the benefit of each employee
or retiree.312 Absent an identifiable fund “owned” by the pension
recipient or the employee, such as perhaps an annuity purchased
in the name of the recipient or a brokerage account in the name
of the recipient, the fact that state and local pension promises
might be considered “property” for due process purposes does not
mean that they are protected by the Takings Clause from
rejection or reduction in bankruptcy.
However, even if there is no federal remedy available, state
constitutional and statutory provisions, discussed above, may
to authorize destruction of liens to avoid constitutional question of whether
destruction would be a taking requiring compensation). The interaction between
bankruptcy law and takings principles became an issue during the Great
Depression when Congress enacted statutes providing for relief of bankrupt
homeowners against mortgage foreclosure. See Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 590 (1935) (finding bankruptcy law
unconstitutional insofar as it authorized “the taking of substantive rights in
specific property acquired by the” creditor, namely a mortgage held by a bank).
But see Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, Va., 300
U.S. 440, 462–63 (1937) (upholding amended provisions preserving mortgagees’
interest while imposing a stay on foreclosure proceedings subject to the
discretion of the federal court). For a more recent affirmation of the
constitutionality of adjusting mortgagees’ rights in bankruptcy, see Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Bullington, 878 F.2d 354, 358–60 (11th Cir. 1989).
311. See In re Nolan, 232 F.3d 528, 534 n.10 (6th Cir. 2000)
Every bankruptcy involves a “transfer” of private property from a
creditor to a debtor, in the sense that a creditor is involuntarily
deprived of a previously-vested, legally-enforceable debtor obligation
to return borrowed creditor property. However, mere reconciliation of
debts among private entities does not normally constitute taking
private property for public use.
In municipal bankruptcy, the “public use” requirement might be met, but the
adjustment of claims would still not constitute a “taking.”
312. Even if there were some separable property interest that could be
claimed by each public pension plan participant, ordinarily the interest would
be protected only to the extent of its value at the time of bankruptcy. See Skeel,
supra note 83, at 698 (“It is quite likely that a court would conclude that pension
beneficiaries do have a property interest, but only to the extent of the funds the
state has set aside for payment.”).
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impose substantial impediments to state pension reform.313 As
noted, many states prohibit diminution of pension benefits for
both retired workers and workers currently employed.314 In such
states, state courts may declare null and void legislation or
executive action purporting to reduce benefits. In these states,
and in light of the possibility of federal civil rights injunctive
relief, federal bankruptcy law may be necessary to bring about
meaningful pension reform in some states. However, as noted,
most states do not allow their municipalities to employ
bankruptcy to adjust their debts.315 Whether courts in those
states would prevent reform even in dire financial circumstances,
remains, perhaps, to be seen.
VI. Concluding Observations
The public pension crisis, in part, is a state and local analog
to the spiraling federal debt. Without significant reform, state
and local governments will have to devote increasingly large
portions of their limited revenues to fulfilling pension promises
that may have been made decades before. We have already seen
significant reductions in government services in states with high
pension costs, such as California. That state, which once boasted
of the most comprehensive and inexpensive higher education
systems in the nation, is now finding it impossible, for example,
to continue to offer sufficient community college slots for all
students.316 Pension costs are a major contributor to California’s
financial difficulties.317
313. See supra Part III.B (discussing state law limitations on pension
reform).
314. See supra Part III.A (noting state prohibitions on diminution of pension
benefits).
315. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text (explaining a
municipality may not use federal bankruptcy law if applicable state law does not
allow it).
316. See Andy Kroll, California Education’s Painful Decline, SALON.COM
(Oct. 2, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/10/02/california_educations_
painful_decline/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (describing the financial difficulties
facing California’s higher education system) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
317. See Vauhini Vara, California Workers to Shoulder More Pension Costs,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239
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The pension funding crisis is different from other forms of
deficit spending because it involves obligations to individuals,
specifically current and former government employees. Most
references to the “public pension crisis” are to the financial
aspects of the problem. This masks the most important crisis, the
human crisis. The vast majority of people receiving government
pensions are not wealthy. If many pension plans follow the lead of
Central Falls, Rhode Island, it would be a crushing financial blow
to many pension recipients, especially those who never
participated in the federal Social Security system. Most state and
local pensions are relatively modest, and the workers and
employers involved have contributed to their pensions the way
that workers and employers in the private sector pay Social
Security taxes and contribute to 401k accounts, often coupled
with employer contributions.318 These workers have structured
their finances and made career and personal decisions in reliance
on their pension expectations. Reforms that involve significant
reductions in pension payouts or large increases in employee
pension contributions may appear to be unfair to the majority of
workers who have not engaged in any significant manipulation of
their pension entitlements. Of course, when a private business
goes into bankruptcy, many people’s legitimate expectations are
upset, even people who cannot afford the losses they are forced to
bear.
In a sense, public pension recipients are in a similar position,
but on the lower end of the economic scale, to the victims of
Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. In many public pension funds,
the level of contributions was established based on the
expectation that the funds would earn 8% per year.319 While
average returns over the last twenty years or so may be in that
6390443696604577647830855542636.html (describing the costs of California’s
pension system).
318. State and local employers and employees contribute, on average, a total
of 18.5% of salary to public pension funds covering employees not participating
in Social Security (10.5% for the employer and 8% for the employee). Social
Security contributions for other workers total 12.4%, with employers and
employees contributing 6.2% each. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & MAURICIO SOTO, CTR.
FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE AND LOCAL
PENSIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM PRIVATE PLANS 4 (2007), http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2007/11/slp_1.pdf.
319. BAKER, supra note 24, at 5.
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range, over the last decade the returns have been closer to 6%,320
with a 3.2% annual return over the past five years.321 In the fiscal
year ending June 30th, 2012, the two largest California public
pension funds earned 1% and 1.8%, while New York State’s
largest fund earned 6% in its fiscal year that ended in March,
before significant market losses in the second quarter of 2012.322
If returns remain well below the 8% level usually relied upon,
underfunding will only get worse, and pension fund participants’
expectations will become more and more unrealistic.
Another analog to the Madoff scandal is that these workers
were likely led to believe that their employers were contributing
to the pension fund in amounts sufficient to fund the promises
that were being made. Just as Madoff’s victims received
fabricated statements indicating investment gains that did not
exist, government workers were told what level of benefits they
should expect and that money was being set aside each month on
their behalf.
The fairness of significant reductions in pension benefits
depends on a variety of considerations, including the magnitude
of the contributions made by retirees and employees to the
retirement system; the degree to which pensions were spiked in
ways not related to the true earnings of the employees; the degree
to which employees accepted lower current wages in exchange for
generous retirement benefits; and the other ways in which
employees structured their finances and their personal and
professional lives around their pension expectations. Employees
may have rejected other employment opportunities such as
moving into higher-paying private sector jobs without pension
benefits and they may have saved less for retirement in reliance
on their pensions. These decisions are irrevocable for older
workers and retirees who have insufficient or no remaining time
left in the work force to ameliorate the consequences of these
decisions.

320. Jillian Mincer, U.S. Public Pension Funds to Face Calls to Set Realistic
Targets, REUTERS (July 23, 2012, 5:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/07/23/us-usa-pensions-finreturns-idUSBRE86M1AA20120723 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
321. BIGGS, supra note 23, at 12.
322. Mincer, supra note 320.

THE PUBLIC PENSION CRISIS

87

Reforms may seem less unfair if pension promises were
unrealistically generous in light of contributions to pension funds
and true rates of return on pension fund investments. Reduction
in benefits may not seem unfair if contributions similar to or
slightly higher than those made to Social Security resulted in
pension promises two, three, or four times higher than Social
Security benefits that would have been earned in that program.323
If workers or their unions understood that their contributions
were based on projected returns that were way out of line with
the market, it might not seem unfair to make them bear some of
the pain of the shortfall that has resulted, especially if
government salaries are similar to or even higher than private
sector salaries, as some analysts claim.324 However, this ignores
the inducement aspect of pension promises, that state and local
workers were induced to accept and remain in their jobs in part
based on the pension promises that were continually made during
their employment.
Reform may seem even less unfair when it is directed at
activities that seem to fall into the general category of pension
spiking. Insofar as pension benefit calculations are inflated by
including overtime, secondary jobs, longevity pay, and artificial
promotions, reducing benefits may seem perfectly fair. Public
pensions should compensate employees fairly and provide
economic security, not provide an opportunity to game the
system. Of course, rules in many areas of law are subject to
manipulation, but it is generally not viewed as unfair when
reforms are directed at issues properly characterized as
“loopholes.”

323. As noted above, public pension participants contribute somewhat more
to their pension funds than the amounts required for participation in Social
Security. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text (discussing the
comparison between Social Security contributions and pension contributions).
Higher returns for public pension participants may be justified in part because
those funds invest in the stock market, while Social Security funds are invested
only in federal Treasury bills that earn a relatively low rate of return.
324. For this view, see, for example, Andrew Biggs & Jason Richwine,
Comparing Federal and Private Sector Compensation (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub.
Policy Research, Working Paper, 2011), http://www.aei.org/files/ 2011/06/08/AEIWorking-Paper-on-Federal-Pay-May-2011.pdf
(arguing
that
government
compensation is higher than private sector compensation).
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s statement that
changes to pension plans are constitutional if they are
“reasonable and bear some material relationship to the theory of
a pension system and its successful operation”325 can help provide
the basis for a general understanding of how the contractual
underpinnings of contemporary pensions should be tempered to
allow for reforms to abusive pension practices. Government
pensions are designed to provide financial security, incentives to
faithful long-term government service, and to perhaps make up
for the lower salaries of government employees, while providing
for the reduced economic needs for retired workers as compared
to people still active in the work force. Under traditional,
straightforward contract principles, employees can make a
persuasive case that they should be able to take advantage of all
of the features of the pension system in place during their
employment. These could include provisions that enable pensions
to be spiked based on second, part-time jobs, volunteer service,
and longevity bonuses, designed simply to increase pensions. The
Massachusetts court’s comment encourages viewing pension
reform from the perspective of the goals and nature of a pension
system rather than as a simple contractual arrangement.
Amounts earned through “gaming” the system are inconsistent
with the theory of a pension system. No worker should have a
legitimate expectation of a pension boosted by part-time work,
end-of-career promotions, and longevity pay earned simply by
informing the government employer that retirement is a year or
more away.
The simple contractual view is inconsistent with
contemporary application of the Contract Clause. Rather than
simply disallow all retrospective modifications of the terms of
both private and government contracts, the Supreme Court
allows even substantial impairments of government contracts if
they are supported by an important government interest. This
contemporary standard rejects a simplistic contractual view of
government-citizen contractual relations in favor of a more
realistic view, imbued with policy and analysis of the legitimacy
of private expectations.
325. Madden v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 729 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (Mass.
2000) (quoting Wisley v. San Diego, 188 Cal. App. 2d 482, 485–86 (1961)).
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Reforms targeting abuses should be allowed under any
theory. Government employees may recognize that there are
contractually-protected loopholes and devices that allow them to
spike their pensions. They also probably understand, however,
that they are taking advantage of technicalities that go beyond
the spirit of the government pension program. A purely
contractual view would not take this into account. The core of
pensions based on a person’s true long-term service and economic
reliance should be protected, but contractual formalities should
not prevent the closing of loopholes and the elimination of
methods that allow pension spiking.
Fairness aside, if the financial situation of government
pension funds does not improve, many state workers and retirees
may suffer severe reductions in their pension benefits as public
entities find it economically or politically impossible to meet their
obligations to retired workers. Municipalities may reduce pension
benefits through bankruptcy and states may unilaterally reduce
benefits and use their unique positions as sovereign states to
resist judicial remedies based on state or federal law. These
possibilities may give pension plan participants strong incentives
to negotiate over their pension benefits, perhaps resulting in the
acceptance of significant reductions that are less painful than
what would have otherwise occurred.
What might the future hold for the public pension systems?
While reflecting on the relative impecunity of many government
pension recipients and their legitimate expectations based on
years of contributions and service, it is worth considering
whether public pensions should be bailed out the way that
financial institutions have been bailed out in the past. According
to the website propublica.com, 928 institutions have received
more than $600 billion in federal bailout funds during the recent
financial crisis.326 This includes nearly $200 billion to the quasigovernmental Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and nearly $70
billion to the insurance company AIG.327 Other large institutions
receiving billions of dollars in bailout funds include General
326. Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA.COM (Oct. 12, 2012), http://projects.
propublica.org/bailout/list (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
327. Id.
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Motors, Bank of America, and Citigroup.328 There have been
additional government bailouts in the United States, including
the rescue of New York City in 1975, Chrysler in 1980, and the
savings and loan industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s.329
Perhaps the federal government should step in, in a cooperative
plan with the states, and provide funds, loans, and other
financing to bail out underfunded public pension funds. If the
government is willing to provide funds for mismanaged banks
and insurance companies, why not for pension funds? In fact, this
would not be the first time that the federal government provided
financial assistance to distressed states,330 although the tendency
is for the federal government to stand by while states default on
their debts rather than bail them out.331
One modest proposed bailout of state and local pension funds
is for the federal government to guarantee pension obligation
bonds issued by states.332 Additional proposals in the same vein
would provide federal guarantees or favorable tax treatment for
such bonds on the condition that the state adopt certain austerity
measures such as moving to defined contribution pension plans
for new employees and fully funding existing defined benefit
plans.333 These proposals are designed to relieve some of the fiscal
pressure on state and local governments while preserving
employees’ pensions.334
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See Johnson & Young, supra note 178, at 137–38 (describing federal
assumption of state Revolutionary War debts in exchange for allowing the
establishment of the national capital on the banks of the Potomac as well as
federal aid to states in several recessions since 1973).
331. See id. (describing general practice of federal government allowing
states to default, especially in the 1840s and late nineteenth century).
332. See Debra Brubaker Burns, Note, Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Pay:
States, Their Public-Pension Bills, and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 253, 276 (2011) (citing Governor Pat Quinn, Illinois State Budget Fiscal
Year 2012 at 29 (2012), http://www2.illinois.gov/budget/Documents/
FY%202012/FY12_ Operating_Budget.pdf).
333. See id. at 276–77 (describing the measures taken by many states).
334. Johnson & Young discuss in detail conditions the federal government
might impose on states receiving federal bailout funds. See Johnson & Young,
supra note 178, at 139–42. There are constitutional limits on the conditions the
federal government may place on the receipt of federal funds. See South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding the federal government’s conditioning of
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There are many practical reasons to be cautious about
bailing out public pension funds. The most obvious is that it
would be very expensive: in the trillions of dollars, especially if
health care promises to retirees are included. It should be noted
that according to the New York Times, the government’s total
commitment of loans and other investments in the recent
financial bailout may total more than $12 trillion,335 but still, in
present circumstances, any request to spend trillions more would
be greeted with great skepticism to say the least. Further, bailing
out hundreds of public pension funds would be a difficult and
complex undertaking with enormous moral hazard implications.
Each of the hundreds of underfunded pension funds is
underfunded to a different degree and got there in its own way.
Some funds were abusive, with extravagant promises and
minimal contributions, while others simply suffered from
lackluster investment performance perhaps owing to unrealistic,
but good faith, predictions. Some large bureaucracy, like the
Resolution Trust Corporation of the savings and loan crisis, but
much larger, would have to be created, and standards would have
to be developed to guide the treatment of the funds based on
numerous variables.
The moral hazard problem is also significant. In some states
and localities, corruption has contributed significantly to
extravagant pension promises. Unless serious consequences are
highway grants on lowering the minimum drinking age, but noting that these
conditions are subject to several restrictions, including being in pursuit of the
general welfare). In the pension area, they speculate that a federal bailout
“might also require the states to alter some of their obligations to public-sector
unions, pension holders and the like.” Johnson & Young, supra note 178, at 143.
They speculate that the federal government may not have the power to require
states to violate the Contract Clause as a condition for receiving federal funds.
Id. at 143. As in the case of municipal bankruptcy, this may not be a real
problem when federal law dictates changes to state pension plans. There would
be no Contract Clause violation since the federal government is not subject to
the Contract Clause. Id. at 143. Rather, federal legislation must meet the much
more lenient constitutional standard governing retroactive legislation. Id. at
144–46 (discussing Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), which
struck down as unconstitutional the Coal Act, which retroactively imposed
liability on coal companies for their employees’ health care costs).
335. Adding Up the Government’s Total Bailout Tab, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-bailouttotals-graphic.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review.
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attached to abusive behavior and effective controls are put in
place, losses may continue after bailouts.336 We have seen this in
what seems, at this point, to be a regularly occurring cycle of
bailouts directed at financial institutions. If state and local
pension funds are too big to fail, their managers can continue
with their untoward behavior, assured that the federal
government will be there to pick up the pieces when things fall
apart.
Despite all of this, the human case in favor of a bailout is
compelling. The Rhode Island legislature recognized this when it
appropriated funds to cushion the blow suffered by Central Falls
retirees. The possibility of large numbers of retirees without
sufficient pensions to stay out of poverty may not threaten to
bring down the entire financial system, but it is a prospect that is
contrary to the ideals established by the Social Security system,
that the elderly should have sufficient resources to live out their
remaining years with dignity. Of course, there are competing
demands for every government dollar, and in an era with no
appetite for tax increases, spending on the elderly may come out
of funds that might have been devoted to education or health care
for children and the poor. There are obviously no easy answers,
but the possibility of a large-scale bailout should at least be part
of the conversation. Retirees are entitled to at least as much
consideration as financial institutions and government
bondholders.
Looking at the more distant future, steps ought to be taken
to avoid the possibility of this happening again. Investment
volatility and political considerations are likely to continue to
threaten the financial viability of pension funds if they continue
as currently structured. As of yet, there has been no large-scale
movement in government away from benefit plans toward defined
contribution 401k-style plans. This may be due to a combination
of worker resistance and a perceived financial difficulty of
making the transition when underfunded pension plans need
continued contributions to move toward actuarial soundness.337
336. For example, consider the multi-billion dollar trading losses suffered by
JPMorgan Chase after it received (and paid back) $25 billion in federal bailout
funds. See Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Hits Executive Reset Button, WALL ST.
J., July 2, 2012, at B1 (describing JPMorgan’s trading losses).
337. One respected expert, a zealous advocate of requiring that pensions be
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In Massachusetts, for example, one element of pension reform is
a long-term schedule for eliminating municipal pension
underfunding by requiring higher municipal contributions until
full funding is achieved in 2025.338 Assuming that no significant
movement is made away from defined benefit plans toward
contribution plans, reform is likely to include further attacks on
pension spiking and a combination of reduced benefits and
increased contributions from workers. More states may require
their workers to join the federal Social Security program and
then scale down the size of pensions accordingly. Health care
benefits are likely to be cut by requiring greater contributions
from retirees toward premiums, and by increasing co-pays and
deductibles.
One final thought. The recent controversy over collective
bargaining rights in Wisconsin and related events may lead some
to believe that the public pension crisis is less about the problem
of chronic underfunding of pensions, and more about the slow but
steady elimination of economic security for middle class workers
in the United States. Public employment is the last bastion of
unionized labor in the United States. Unionized workers tend to
earn higher salaries and benefits and enjoy greater job security
than their nonunionized counterparts. Perhaps because of this,
many unionized jobs in the United States’ private sector have
disappeared, with manufacturing leading the way. Until now,
relatively low-level state and local employees have been able to
remain in the middle class and have enjoyed economic security in
retirement. Pension reform and elimination of collective
bargaining rights could signal the end of that.339 It may be only a
based on actual contributions, concludes that the transition problem does not
exist and is a false argument raised by pension plan administrators to stave off
reform. See Robert M. Costrell, “GASB Won’t Let Me”: A False Objection to
Pension Reform, LJAF POLICY PERSPECTIVE (May 2012), http://www.
arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/A9R4D8C.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Costrell does not
believe that there is an actual transition problem, and he advocates linking
pension benefits to actual contributions to the pension plan. Id.
338. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 22c (2008). It appears that the
Massachusetts legislature altered the schedule in reaction to the stock market
and general financial downturn of 2008.
339. Pension reform advocate Robert Costrell blames collective bargaining
for the high cost of teacher fringe benefits, including health care expenses and
pension promises not based on teacher contributions to the pension fund. Robert
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matter of time before the twentieth century is viewed by public
workers as the good old days.

M. Costrell, Oh, to be a Teacher in Wisconsin: How Can Fringe Benefits Cost
Nearly as Much as a Worker’s Salary? Answer: Collective Bargaining, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 25, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034086045
76164290717724956.html (last visted Jan. 19, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Costrell points out that in Wisconsin, some
collective bargaining agreements, including Milwaukee’s, provided that the
school district pays both the employer and employee contributions to the
pension system. Id. This is also true with regard to health care premiums, so
that in fiscal year 2011, teachers in Milwaukee contributed nothing to their
health care premiums, which amounted to 50.9 cents on top of every dollar paid
in wages. Id. These practices have been altered by reform legislation in
Wisconsin. Id.

